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ARTICLES
THE LAW OF TYPICALITY: EXAMINING THE
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS
OF SANDIN V. CONNER
Donna H. Lee*
Although the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
has long protected against deprivations that implicate state-created
liberty interests as well as core constitutional concerns, the Supreme
Court changed course in liberty interest jurisprudence in Sandin v.
Conner. It retreated from a positivist approach and articulated a
new test for determining when a prisoner's claim warrants
procedural due process. The Court held that the challenged action
must impose an "atypical and significant" hardship, but provided
little guidance on how to measure typicality and significance. This
Article proposes a methodology for examining typicality that is
grounded in empirical evidence and advocates a balancing test that
weighs typicality based on actual state practices, significance as a de
minimis threshold, and state positive law as an evidentiary tool in
determining whether a liberty interest is at stake. In contrast to the
actual approaches taken by the lower courts interpreting Sandin, this
proposal has the benefit of promoting consistency, integrity, and
coherence in the development of the law regarding state-created
liberty interests.
INTRODUCTION
Does the scope of a prisoner's constitutional right to due process
vary from state to state? Two prisoners in two different states are
found guilty on escape charges following prison disciplinary hearings.
In both cases, the prisoner had told a guard that if he was not granted
a certain housing placement, he would try to escape, and in both cases,
the only evidence at the hearing was the prisoner's statement. In the
first case, a federal court found a procedural due process violation
* Clinical Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., 1986, Brown University;
J.D., 1991, New York University School of Law. I am grateful to Stacy Caplow, Susan
Herman, Ted Janger, Claire Kelly, Minna Kotkin, Benjamin Lee, Raymond Lohier,
Daniel Medwed, and Benjamin Zipursky for their insightful suggestions on an earlier
draft.
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based on the absence of evidence of guilt.' In the second, a federal
court held that the punishment imposed as a result of the escape
conviction, which was more severe than in the first case, was
insufficient to trigger procedural due process protections.2 These
different outcomes represent more than individual courts reaching
varying decisions. They resulted from significant differences in the
courts' methodologies for analyzing due process claims.
Although the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
clearly provides protection against certain extreme deprivations of
liberty,3 the contours of state-created liberty interests that also give
rise to due process protection are murky at best. The scope of the
constitutional prohibition against any state taking of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law,"4 depends on the meaning of
life, liberty and property, and courts have traditionally used state law
to inform and expand the definition of these concepts.5 This Article
proposes a new approach for determining when and how state law and
practice should be used in liberty interest analysis in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Conner.6
1. Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1999); see also infra
text accompanying notes 235-41.
2. Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2002); see also infra text
accompanying notes 196-204.
3. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (recognizing a
prisoner's liberty interest in avoiding involuntary injection with anti-psychotic drugs);
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) (recognizing a prisoner's liberty interest in
avoiding involuntary transfer to a state mental hospital).
4. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the framework for this Article is
based on challenges to state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, my analysis
also applies to challenges to federal action under the Fifth Amendment guarantee of
due process.
5. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975) ("Protected interests in
property are normally 'not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined' by an independent source such as state statutes or rules
entitling the citizen to certain benefits." (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972))); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) ("[T]he State having
created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction
authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner's interest has real substance and is
sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty' to entitle him to those
minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due
Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.").
6. 515 U.S. 472 (1995). The scholarly commentary on Sandin has primarily been
in the form of student articles and has generally criticized Sandin for limiting
prisoners' due process rights too narrowly. See, e.g., Michelle C. Ciszak, Note, Sandin
v. Conner: Locking Out Prisoners' Due Process Claims, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1101
(1996) (criticizing failure to recognize liberty interest in avoiding solitary confinement
and limitation of federal forum for due process claims); John K. Edwards, Note, A
Prisoner's Threshold for Procedural Due Process After Sandin v. Conner:
Conservative Activism or Legitimate Compromise?, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 1521 (1997)
(asserting that the Court misapplied a workable test and criticizing its failure to focus
on the duration and physical conditions of solitary confinement); Christopher D.
Meyer, Note, Objective Expectations, Liberty Interests, and Official Discretion:
Sandin v. Conner Considered in Light of Colorado Inmates Facing Administrative
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In Sandin, the Court's self-described purpose was to return to due
process principles described in precedent from the mid-1970s7 and to
retreat from the positivist methodology for analyzing prisoners' due
process claims established a decade later in Hewitt v. Helms.8 In doing
so, however, Sandin raised more questions than it answered, and the
lower courts have struggled to craft a coherent and effective approach
for determining when a prisoner's claim implicates due process
concerns. 9 Ignoring positivism's utility in examining prisoners' due
process claims,1" the Sandin Court focused instead on the concept of
Segregation, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 229 (1997) (asserting that placement in
administrative segregation harms an inmate's chance of parole and thus results in an
"atypical and significant" hardship); The Supreme Court, 1994 Term - Leading Cases,
109 Harv. L. Rev. 111, 150 (1995) (predicting that after Sandin, "the future does not
bode well for the success of prisoners' due process claims"); Philip W. Sbaratta, Note,
Sandin v. Conner: The Supreme Court's Narrowing of Prisoner's Due Process and the
Missed Opportunity to Discover True Liberty, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 744 (1996)
(criticizing Sandin for narrowing liberty interest jurisprudence too much and
advocating use of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test); Deborah R. Stagner, Note,
Sandin v. Conner: Redefining State Prisoners' Liberty Interest and Due Process
Rights, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1761 (1996) (providing an overview of due process
jurisprudence and advocating vigorous federal court protection of prisoners' due
process rights); James E. Robertson, The Decline of Negative Implication
Jurisprudence: Procedural Fairness in Prison Discipline After Sandin v. Conner, 32
Tulsa L.J. 39 (1996) (asserting that procedural safeguards should be required for
deprivations that affect good time credits); cf Barbara Belbot, Where Can a Prisoner
Find a Liberty Interest These Days? The Pains of Imprisonment Escalate, 42 N.Y.L.
Sch. L. Rev. 1, 69 (1998) (criticizing the Court's perspective of "atypical or
significant" as based "at best, on an uninformed and naive understanding of prison
life, or, at worst, on a mean-spirited attitude that panders to society's less noble
instincts"); Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights: Congress and
the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 Or. L. Rev. 1229, 1255-61 (1998) (interpreting
Sandin as having created a new pleading requirement that may have collapsed due
process protection to the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment).
7. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Wolff,
418 U.S. at 539).
8. 482 U.S. 755 (1987); see also infra text accompanying notes 62-73; Sandin, 515
U.S. at 483 n.5. Positive law refers to "tl]aw actually and specifically enacted or
adopted by proper authority for the government of an organized jural society,"
Black's Law Dictionary 1162 (6th ed. 1990), such as state statutes and regulations.
9. The Court has generally hewn closely to the two-step analysis developed in
Board of Regents v. Roth: Has the plaintiff been deprived of liberty or property, and
if so was it without due process of law? 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See generally Cynthia R.
Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 Yale J.L. & Feminism 189, 191-96 (1991)
(discussing procedural due process doctrine before and after Roth). But Sandin
marks a departure in the way the first step of this familiar methodology is applied.
10. See Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights
of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 482, 487-503
(1984) (describing the emergence of positivism and reliance on state statutes in
defining property and liberty interests after Board of Regents v. Roth); cf Rodney A.
Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law:
The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 69, 75-94 (1982) (tracing the
evolution of entitlement doctrine as a specific application of the right-privilege
distinction).
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"'grievous loss ..... It held that a deprivation does not reach liberty
interest status and require procedural due process protection, unless it
imposes an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life. '12 The Court thus forged
typicality and significance as two tools for evaluating due process
claims, but provided little guidance on their use and left open the
question of positivism's role. Courts in most circuits, nevertheless,
have continued to use state positive law when analyzing prisoners' due
process claims.13
My central thesis is that judgments about typicality must be
grounded in empirical evidence regarding a state's actual practices.
Sandin charged federal courts with the task of deciding whether a
deprivation is sufficiently "atypical and significant" to warrant
procedural due process protections. A determination about typicality
by its nature is standardless, however, unless it is anchored in a factual
analysis of how prisoners are actually treated. By contrast, since
courts routinely make judgments about significance in a variety of
contexts, 4 this factor can be applied as a de minimis threshold test
without any particular reference to state practice or law. Finally,
positivism should remain an important interpretive, as opposed to
definitional, tool. 5 The language of statutes and regulations are
relevant to a state's assessment of a potential deprivation's
importance and to the legitimacy of a prisoner's expectations.
Considering typicality, significance, and state law as balancing
factors in determining whether a prisoner's claim implicates a liberty
interest will assist in the development of a coherent and principled
liberty interest jurisprudence. Additionally, keying the existence of
state-created liberty interests to the practice of state actors and
existence of state law should enhance predictability. Actual practices
11. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) ("The extent to which
procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to
which he may be 'condemned to suffer a grievous loss"' (citing Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
12. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 252-56.
14. An analysis of significance should entail an assessment of both (1) the nature
of the interest at stake in terms of whether it implicates a core constitutional value
and (2) the weight of the interest as measured by the impact of the deprivation on the
individual. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481-82.
15. Although the Sandin Court's shift away from a purely positivist approach
reflected concern about state law creating an overabundance of liberty interests, its
movement away from dependence on state law could have an unintended opposite
result, allowing for the existence of a liberty interest where a deprivation is atypical
and significant despite the absence of state law protections. Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies,
93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 328 (1993) (asserting that exclusive reliance on positive law
"would allow the states to evade due process restraints by refusing to recognize that
'property' exists").
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and actual law will inform the constitutional inquiry, as opposed to a
court's subjective sense of what rises to the level of a liberty interest.
However unsettling the federal courts' role in defining liberty interests
may seem, 16 when tethered to a methodology of using empirical
practices and state law as evidentiary tools, it is a legitimate part of
their traditional province. 7
The concept of typicality begs the question of what constitutes the
appropriate comparative baseline. Is the challenged behavior X
typical as compared to Y, and what exactly is Y? The absence of a
liberty interest in intra- or inter-state prison transfers" militates in
favor of a nationwide standard for typicality. However, when
factoring in the likelihood that a transfer will occur, and in light of
practical problems regarding the scope of discovery ordinarily allowed
in prisoner cases, statewide practices should inform the typicality
baseline. Over time, as individual cases require the compilation of
empirical evidence regarding state practices, a common law of
typicality (or database of cases) will develop which can ease the
burden of making a judgment about typicality. Although some
variation from state to state is inevitable, a typicality database would
assist in addressing the potential problem of outlier states with
practices that fall below an otherwise uniform, nationwide range of
practices. Prisoners in such states could have an actionable claim,
even in the absence of state-specific positive law and even if the
typical practice in that state did not require procedural due process
protection.
Part I sets the doctrinal stage for understanding Sandin within the
context of prisoners' due process jurisprudence. Part II examines the
Sandin decision itself. Part III analyzes how the courts have applied
Sandin, categorizes their interpretive approaches, and critiques these
16. See Farina, supra note 9, at 205 (describing the Lochner objection to giving an
unelected, unaccountable judiciary power over the majoritarian process); cf. Henry
Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 414-16 (1977)
(questioning the departure from the language of the Constitution in ascribing a
broader meaning to liberty than freedom from physical restraint).
17. Cf Fallon, supra note 15, at 328-29 (acknowledging that whether a state-
created right constitutes "property" under the Due Process Clause is a mixed
question of federal constitutional law and state law); Robert Jerome Glennon,
Constitutional Liberty and Property: Federal Common Law and Section 1983, 51 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 355, 366-67 (1978) (asserting that federal common law should determine
the existence of constitutionally protected liberty and property rights); William Van
Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445, 473 n.84 (1977) (noting "a serious
inconsistency in the manner in which the Supreme Court has tied the (wholly federal)
question of the meaning of 'property' in the fourteenth amendment so tightly to
technicalities of state law").
18. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216 (1976) (finding no liberty interest
requiring procedural due process before an intra-state prison transfer); Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249-51 (1983) (finding no liberty interest requiring
procedural due process before an inter-state prison transfer).
2004]
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approaches along three continua: ease/difficulty of application,
consistency/unpredictability of outcomes, and integrity/incoherence of
methodology. Part IV proposes that typicality be determined through
the use of empirical evidence, and that typicality, significance, and
state law be used as balancing factors in determining whether a liberty
interest is at stake and due process protections should apply. It also
evaluates the merits of this proposal using the same criteria
introduced in Part III.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: FROM WOLFF TO SANDIN
An analysis of the doctrinal developments leading up to Sandin is
informed by a basic understanding of how prisoners' due process cases
are filed and the political context in which these cases are evaluated.
Prisoners alleging a violation of their civil rights generally sue under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.19 The rules governing when state prisoners are
prohibited from filing a § 1983 claim, and required instead to file a
habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which requires
exhaustion of state remedies as a precondition of filing, are complex. °
For purposes of this Article, however, the exact vehicle a prisoner
uses to bring a due process claim does not affect the analysis a federal
court should employ in deciding the substance of that claim.2'
Although the gross number of prisoner petitions in the twelve month
period ending on September 30, 2002, declined to 55,295 from a high
of 68,235 in 1996, the 2002 figure still represents approximately 20%
of all civil cases commenced in federal district courts.2 In the same
19. In 2000, 80% of prisoner petitions were filed by state prisoners, and of these
80%, more than half (53%) alleged civil rights violations under § 1983. When adding
in the 20% of petitions filed by federal prisoners, approximately 44% alleged § 1983
violations, more than any other individual category of claim. See Bureau of Justice
Statistics Special Report, Prisoner Petitions Filed in U.S. District Courts, 2000, with
Trends 2 (1980-2000) (revised Feb. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ppfusd00.htm [hereinafter Prisoner Petitions].
Civil rights violations by federal officials are covered under § 1983 pursuant to Bivens
v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
20. Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of this article, as a general
matter prisoners challenging the fact or duration of their imprisonment must exhaust
state remedies prior to prosecuting a federal court claim. See Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997)
(requiring prisoners seeking damages based on prison disciplinary proceedings that
involved the loss of good time credits to pursue habeas relief); Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (requiring prisoners seeking damages based on allegedly
unlawful criminal convictions to pursue habeas relief).
21. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in or before 1995, alleged due
process violations accounted for 14% of habeas corpus claims and 13% of § 1983 civil
rights claims. See Prisoner Petitions, supra note 19, at 5 (citing Federal Habeas Corpus
Review, BJS Discussion Paper, NCJ 155504, Sept. 1995; Challenging the Conditions of
Prisons and Jails, BJS Discussion Paper, NCJ 151652, Feb. 1995).
22. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 2002 Annual Report of
the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts 132 (2002), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/c02asep02.pdf; Administrative Office
[Vol. 72
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way that the Supreme Court contributed to and then sought to control
the so-called due process and § 1983 litigation explosion during the
1970s,23 it engendered and then attempted to curtail the scope of
prisoners' rights litigation. Congress similarly has attempted,
apparently successfully, to restrict the number of lawsuits filed by
individual prisoners through the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PLRA"),24 reflecting the popular notion in the 1990s of a federal
judiciary "drowning in a sea of frivolous prisoner petitions. '25 Judicial
weariness with prison litigation reflects in part the difficulty of
distinguishing between the lawful deprivation of liberty represented
by imprisonment, and the margin of constitutional rights and liberty
retained by prisoners.2 6 This section examines the Supreme Court's
movement from the expansion of due process rights in Wolff v.
McDonnell,27 to the contraction of these rights in Sandin.
Wolff marks the beginning of the Supreme Court's reliance on a
state-created liberty interest as the basis for a federal due process
violation. 28  The state statute governing inmate discipline provided
that misconduct would be punished by the deprivation of privileges,
except when the misconduct was "flagrant or serious," in which case a
prisoner could lose good time credits,29 or be held in a disciplinary cell
of the United States Courts, 1997 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of
the United States Courts 132 (1997), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicial-business/c2asep97.pdf.
23. See Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1268
(1975) (asserting that since its 1970 Goldberg v. Kelly decision, the Supreme Court
has participated in a "due process explosion ... carr[ying] the hearing requirement
from one new area of government action to another"); Monaghan, supra note 16, at
408 (observing that the Supreme Court was "struggling to place limits on the level of
federal superintendence of the operations of state and local government, a struggle
which ... occurred largely in the context of 'section 1983' actions").
24. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626, 28
U.S.C. § 1915, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e). The Bureau of Justice Statistics noted that since
the enactment of the PLRA in 1996, the number of prisoners' civil rights petitions
decreased from 41,679 in 1995 to 25,504 in 2000. Controlling for the increases in
prison population over time, it estimated that the PLRA resulted in 3.4 fewer civil
rights petitions per month for every 3,000 state prisoners and 1 fewer petition per
month for every 4,000 federal prisoners. See Prisoner Petitions, supra note 19, at 1, 7.
25. Herman, supra note 6, at 1293.
26. Compare Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) ("There is no iron
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country."), with
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) ("[L]awful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified
by the considerations underlying our penal system." (quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners'
Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285
(1948)))).
27. 418 U.S. at 539.
28. See Herman, supra note 10, at 506-07. In Wolff, the prisoner plaintiffs had
challenged inter alia the prison's disciplinary proceedings, alleging that they violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 418 U.S. at 542-43.
29. Good time credit is a reduction of the time that a prisoner must spend in
prison as opposed to a reduction in the actual sentence. It is "[c]redit allowed on the
sentence which is given for satisfactory conduct in prison. Introduced as an incentive
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in solitary confinement.3" Although the state statute did not establish
specific disciplinary procedures,3' prison regulations outlined the
process for investigation and decision making,32 and the particular
prison, Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, had established
specific procedures.33 Only the Complex's unwritten procedures
included specific requirements regarding a prisoner's role in the
disciplinary process.34
The issue in Wolff was to determine the measure of due process
required for prison disciplinary proceedings. A prisoner has obviously
lost a significant measure of liberty by virtue of lawful incarceration,
but the question remained, to what extent may his or her entitlement
to due process be further "diminished by the needs and exigencies of
the institutional environment."35 The Wolff Court rejected the state's
argument that a prisoner's interest in disciplinary procedures simply is
not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.36 It reasoned that
although good time credit was not specifically guaranteed under the
Constitution, the fact that the state had created the right to good time
credits and had provided for depriving that right only as a sanction for
major misconduct indicated that "the prisoner's interest has real
substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment
'liberty' to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate
under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to
insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated."37
Thus, the Court explicitly relied on state law to support the existence
of a constitutionally protected interest: A person's liberty is protected
"even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State."38
Wolff reiterated two core concepts about due process analysis: first,
that it requires an examination of the weight ("real substance") and
nature ("sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment
'liberty"') of the interest, and second, that it protects against arbitrary
for inmates, it has become practically automatically awarded. It may reduce the
minimum or maximum sentence or both." Black's Law Dictionary 694 (6th ed. 1990).
30. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 545-47, 552 n.9, 571-72 n.19.
31. Id. at 548 (citing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1, 107 (Cum. Supp. 1972) (requiring only
that inmate be consulted when good time credit is at issue)).
32. Id. at 548 & n.8, 542 n.1.
33. Id. at 552-53 & n.10.
34. Id. at 552 n.10, 558-59. The process entailed having the prisoner meet with the
chief correction supervisor and charging officer, and later having the Adjustment
Committee read a conduct report to the prisoner who could deny the charges and ask
questions of the officer who wrote the report.
35. Id. at 555.
36. Id. at 556-57.
37. Id. at 557; cf Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (asserting that although
there is no Fourteenth Amendment due process right to an appeal, once a state has
granted appellate review, it must provide a trial transcript or its equivalent to an
indigent criminal defendant).
38. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558.
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state action.39 The Court organically followed the familiar two-step
process of determining whether there was a due process interest at
stake, and then what process was due."
Wolff established limited due process protections, reversing the
Eighth Circuit's decision that the procedures required for parole and
probation revocation proceedings" were also required for prison
disciplinary proceedings. The Wolff Court examined the "private
interest that has been affected by governmental action" and the
"precise nature of the government function involved."42 Comparing
the grievous loss of parole revocation (the difference between
freedom and imprisonment), with the deprivation of good time credits
(which may or may not affect parole eligibility or termination), the
Court held that the latter is "qualitatively and quantitatively different
from the revocation of parole or probation."43  In weighing the
governmental interest, the Court cited the "unwisdom" of an overly
adversarial process that may "raise the level of confrontation between
staff and inmate," and hinder the use of the disciplinary process as a
rehabilitative tool, as well as the need for "personal security in the
institution.""
39. See id. at 557.
40. Cf Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (first applying a two-
step due process analysis in the context of an alleged property interest).
41. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court found a
constitutionally divined liberty interest in parole and required the following process
before it could be revoked:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole: (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically
finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and
detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of
which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by
the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489; see also id. at 488 n.15 (collecting state statutes from 30 states requiring
some type of hearing in parole revocation proceedings). These protections were
similarly required for probation revocation proceedings along with a limited right to
counsel. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 790-91 (1973); cf Morrissey, 408
U.S. at 489 (declining to reach or decide whether a parolee is entitled to counsel).
Parole is the release from incarceration after serving part of one's sentence, and
probation is a sentence of release into the community under the supervision of a
probation officer. See Black's Law Dictionary 1116, 1202 (6th ed. 1990); cf Gagnon,
411 U.S. at 782-83 n.3 (citing scholarly commentary supporting the proposition that
revocation of parole and probation are constitutionally indistinguishable).
42. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961)); cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing a three-
part due process balancing test involving the private interest, the probable value of a
requested safeguard versus the risk of error if the safeguard is not provided, and the
governmental interest).
43. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 561.
44. Id. at 563.
2004]
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With respect to specific due process requirements, the Wolff Court
held that:
[W]ritten notice of the charges must be given to the disciplinary-
action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable
him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense. At least a brief
period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be
allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the
Adjustment Committee.... [T]here must be a "written statement by
the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons" for the
disciplinary action.45
The Court conditioned an inmate's right to present evidence by
calling witnesses and presenting documents on the state's assessment
of whether doing so would be "unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals[,]" deferring to the judgment of prison
administrators.46 As for the due process requirement of an impartial
decision maker, the Wolff Court concluded that the Complex's
Adjustment Committee did not present "such a hazard of arbitrary
decisionmaking that it should be held violative of due process of
law. '47 Having found that the potential loss to the inmate implicated
due process concerns, the Court narrowly prescribed specific
procedures that it deemed necessary to protect prisoners' due process
rights in disciplinary proceedings.8
In Meachum v. Fano,49 the Supreme Court confirmed the
significance of state law in liberty interest analysis. In holding that the
Due Process Clause does not require a hearing before an intrastate
prison transfer, the Court relied on the absence of state law
restrictions regarding an inmate's transfer from one facility to
another.5" When considering whether transfer from a medium- to a
maximum-security prison in Massachusetts was a constitutionally
45. Id. at 564 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489).
46. Id. at 566. Since the practice at the Complex was to provide a hearing before
the prison's Adjustment Committee, see id. at 553 n.11, and presumably an
opportunity for the prisoner who was the subject of the disciplinary proceedings to
speak on his own behalf, the Court did not explicitly set forth a requirement that the
prisoner have an opportunity to be heard. See id. at 581 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). It denied the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, id. at 567-68, and the right to retained or appointed counsel, id. at 569-70,
but added in dicta that an inmate may be entitled to advice or assistance from another
inmate or prison staff member if the inmate were illiterate or the issue at the
disciplinary hearing sufficiently complex. See id. at 570.
47. Id. at 571. The Adjustment Committee was guided by the facility's written
regulations and its own day-to-day procedures which required inter alia that no
punishment be rendered "capriciously or in the nature of retaliation or revenge." Id.
48. The Court additionally extended these procedures to situations where the
potential punishment was placement in solitary confinement. See id. at 571 n.19.
49. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
50. Id. at 216; cf. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983) (holding that interstate
prison transfers similarly do not give rise to due process protections).
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significant occurrence,51 the Court held that an intrastate transfer, to a
prison which it described as having conditions "which are substantially
less favorable to the prisoner, 52 did not infringe on a liberty interest
under the Due Process Clause.53 The Meachum Court focused on the
nature of the asserted interest, as opposed to its weight, and rejected
the proposition that each and every "grievous loss" or change having a
"substantial adverse impact" gives rise to constitutionally mandated
procedural protections.5 4  The Court reasoned that since the
Constitution does not require a state to have more than one prison, or
to house particular inmates at particular prisons. Therefore, neither a
prisoner's initial placement, nor his or her subsequent transfer to
another institution in the state prison system is "subject to audit under
the Due Process Clause."55  A criminal conviction "sufficiently
extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to empower the State to
confine him in any of its prisons."56 Thus, absent state law creating a
protected liberty interest,
Massachusetts prison officials have the discretion to transfer
prisoners for any number of reasons. Their discretion is not limited
51. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-24.
52. Id. at 216; see also Herman, supra note 10, at 509 n.127 (noting the lack of
detail regarding the disparity between conditions at the medium- and maximum-
security prisons in the Supreme Court's opinion, and describing the basis in the lower
court decisions for concluding that the loss to the transferred inmate was significant).
53. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-24.
54. Id. at 224 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972)
(holding that due process procedures were not required in a faculty layoff because the
nature of the right asserted did not warrant constitutional protection, notwithstanding
the fact that this was a loss of great substance)).
55. Id. The Court further opined that "given a valid conviction, the criminal
defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State
may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the
conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution." Id. Apart from
the Due Process Clause, prisoners retain some measure of their rights under the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection, the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches, and the First Amendment right to access
to courts, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and prohibition against
retaliation. See generally John Boston & Daniel E. Manville, Prisoners' Self-Help
Litigation Manual (3d ed. 1995).
56. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224. The absence of an in-depth analysis of the factual
distinctions between the specific prisons at issue, see id. at 223, leaves open the
possibility that this conclusion may not apply to a transfer to a state facility that can
be characterized as qualitatively different than all other state facilities, such as,
perhaps, a super-maximum prison. See generally Craig Haney & Mona Lynch,
Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary
Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 477, 529-39 (1997) (concluding that
solitary and "supermax" confinement result in damaging psychological effects
following a review of the empirical literature); Human Rights Watch, Cold Storage:
Super-Maximum Security Confinement in Indiana 13-42 (Oct. 1997) (describing
conditions at two maximum security prisons in Indiana as inhumane and abusive),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/usind/; cf Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480
(1980) (requiring due process before a transfer to a state mental hospital).
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to instances of serious misconduct. As we understand it no legal
interest or right of these respondents under Massachusetts law
would have been violated by their transfer .... Whatever
expectation the prisoner may have in remaining at a particular
prison so long as he behaves himself, it is too ephemeral and
insubstantial to trigger procedural due process protections as long as
prison officials have discretion to transfer him for whatever reason
or for no reason at all.57
The Court contrasted its refusal to "impose a nationwide rule
mandating transfer hearings" under the Due Process Clause with the
possibility that an individual state could create law (by statute, rule, or
regulation), or interpret its state constitution to mandate a pre-
transfer hearing." In addition to relying on the concepts of a state-
created liberty interest and what constitutes a legitimate expectation,5 9
the Meachum Court made a policy argument in support of its decision:
[T]o hold as we are urged to do that any substantial deprivation
imposed by prison authorities triggers the procedural protections of
the Due Process Clause would subject to judicial review a wide
spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the
business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts.60
The Court explicitly rejected an interpretation of the Due Process
Clause that would place it "astride the day-to-day functioning of state
prisons and involve the judiciary in issues and discretionary decisions
that are not the business of federal judges., 61
The Court's reliance on state law in analyzing prisoners' due
process rights came to full fruition in Hewitt v. Helms.62 In Hewitt, the
Court considered whether an inmate's transfer from general
population to administrative segregation, which is a more restrictive
category of prison housing,63 gave rise to a liberty interest protected
57. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228.
58. Id. at 229.
59. Cf Herman, supra note 10, at 516-19 (asserting that the Supreme Court
rejected the application of a pseudo-contractual theory regarding a de facto pardon
system based solely on statistical probabilities; as well as the prisoner's misplaced
reliance on a "mutually explicit understanding" that he would be paroled) (citing Jago
v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981) (per curiam); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat,
452 U.S. 458,465 (1981)).
60. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225.
61. Id. at 228-29. Under the approach espoused by this Article, the Court should
have engaged in an empirical analysis of intrastate transfer to determine how
frequently such transfers occurred and for what reasons. Such an analysis would
inform a determination of typicality and result in a better assessment of the legitimacy
of an inmate's expectation that he or she not be transferred without some measure of
due process.
62. 459 U.S. 460 (1983); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 479 (1995) (using
"full fruition" characterization).
63. Pursuant to Pennsylvania regulations, administrative segregation may be used
"when an inmate poses a threat to security, when disciplinary charges are pending
against an inmate, or when an inmate requires protection," Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 463 n.1
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by the Fourteenth Amendment.64 The plaintiff had been placed in
administrative segregation for seven weeks pending a prison
administrative hearing.65 The Court explained that there are two
potential sources for liberty interests, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and state law.66 It rejected the claim that the
Due Process Clause itself affords protection against arbitrary
placement in administrative segregation since "the conditions or
degree of confinement to which the prisoner [was] subjected is within
the sentence imposed ... [and] not otherwise violative of the
Constitution."67  The Hewitt Court posited that placement in "less
amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well
within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison
sentence.,68  The Court further asserted that inmates "should
reasonably anticipate" placement in the administrative segregation "at
some point in their incarceration."69 It confirmed, however, "that a
(citing 37 Pa. Code § 95.104 (1978)), while disciplinary segregation "is imposed when
an inmate has been found to have committed a misconduct violation." Id. (citing 37
Pa. Code § 95.106 (1978)). The Court assumed that conditions in both types of
segregation were the same. See id.; cf. id. at 479 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing conditions in administrative segregation as requiring an inmate to be in
his cell virtually 24-hours a day, as opposed to approximately 14 hours a day out of his
cell; with only five to ten minutes a day for exercise on three to four days a week,
versus having access to the exercise yard and gym for most of the day; limited access
to showers, and no access to vocational, educational, or rehabilitative programs).
64. See id. at 462-69.
65. See id. at 463-65; see also id. at 481 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Following the
hearing, the plaintiff was sentenced to six months of disciplinary segregation. See id.
at 465.
66. See id. at 466-67.
67. Id. at 468 (quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (holding
that there was no due process right to a hearing before being transferred from one
maximum security facility to another maximum security facility). The dissent argued
that the Constitution protects against arbitrary treatment; in other words, that the
state cannot "single[] out one person for adverse treatment significantly different
from that imposed on the community at large." Id. at 485 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Thus, an evaluation of the grievousness of the deprivation requires, at least in part, a
comparison of "the treatment of the particular prisoner with the customary, habitual
treatment of the population of the prison as a whole." Id. at 486 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (noting that "[tihe
touchstone of due process is protection" from arbitrary government action).
68. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468. The Court bolstered this assessment by comparing
placement in administrative segregation with deprivation of good time credits or
parole, reasoning that if the Due Process Clause does not independently protect
mechanisms that involve release from prison, then it does not protect the transfer
within a prison to a more restrictive housing arrangement. See id.
69. Id. Since the facts in Hewitt involved a seven-week placement, it was not clear
whether a significantly longer period of incarceration in administrative segregation
should similarly be "reasonably anticipated." The Court stated in dicta that:
"[Aidministrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement
of an inmate. Prison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the
confinement of such inmates." Id. at 477 n.9. The dissenting opinion contemplated
the "possibility that a prisoner might be kept in segregation simply because prison
officials believe that he should be punished, even though there is insufficient evidence
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State may create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause through its enactment of certain statutory or regulatory
measures," 70 and held that the relevant Pennsylvania statutory
provisions and administrative directive in fact gave rise to a liberty
interest in remaining in the general population. 71 The Hewitt Court
parsed the language of the relevant state law and based its holding on
two factors: (1) the use of mandatory language such as "shall," "will,"
or "must," and (2) the use of "specified substantive predicates" such
as "the need for control. ' 72  Thus, the fact that state law permitted
administrative custody where "there is a threat of a serious
disturbance or a serious threat to the individual or others," and
required that an investigation of an alleged behavior violation "shall
begin immediately," and that absent such violation, "the inmate must
be released.., in all cases within ten days" was dispositive.73
Having determined that placement in administrative segregation
implicated due process protections, the Court turned to the question
of what process was due. Applying a Mathews v. Eldridge74 analysis,
the Hewitt Court concluded that the plaintiff's interests were minimal,
characterizing the deprivation as transfer "from one extremely
restricted environment to an even more confined situation" without a
"stigma of wrongdoing or misconduct" and no apparent parole
consequences.75 In contrast, the Court characterized the state's
interest in placing the plaintiff in administrative segregation to protect
the safety of prison guards and other inmates pending investigation of
his role in a prison riot76 as "perhaps the most fundamental
to support a misconduct charge at a disciplinary hearing." Id. at 493 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). It is unclear why, given the particularized reasons for placement in
administrative segregation, all inmates should "reasonably anticipate" such
placement.
70. Id. at 469. The Court reached this conclusion despite its assertion that
"regulations structuring the authority of prison administrators may warrant
treatment, for purposes of creation of entitlements to 'liberty,' different from statutes
and regulations in other areas." Id. at 470.
71. See id. at 470-71 & n.6. An alternative view, then held by three members of
the Court, was that state law reflects the state's recognition of the "substantiality of
the deprivation" and thus provides "evidentiary support for the conclusion that the
transfer [to administrative segregation] affects a constitutionally-protected interest in
liberty," as opposed to creating a liberty interest. Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"Whether by formal written guidelines or by consistent unwritten practice, the State
establishes the baseline of how it customarily treats the prison population." Id. at 486
n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 471-72; see also id. at 482 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the
Court's reliance on a "magical combination of 'substantive predicates' and 'explicitly
mandatory language').
73. Id. at 470 n.6 (quoting 37 Pa. Code § 95.104(b)(3) (1978)).
74. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
75. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 473.
76. The Court described the situation as one in which multiple groups of prisoners
throughout the institution attacked guards and attempted to take over the prison's
control center. See id. at 462-63.
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responsibility of the prison administration."77 Since the procedural
protection of a "detailed adversary proceeding" would not
measurably assist the state's determination of whether the prisoner
plaintiff posed a true safety threat, and the balance of interests
weighed in favor of the state, the Court held that an "informal
nonadversary review of evidence" was all that was required.78 Due
process required only that there be notice, some opportunity to be
heard, and a decision maker's review of available evidence within a
"reasonable" time frame.79
In a sense, the Hewitt decision contained a blueprint for limiting
state-created liberty interests. All that a state legislature or
administrative agency needed to do was substitute permissive
language such as "may" or "should" for the mandatory language
flagged by the Court as giving rise to liberty interests. Similarly, states
simply could have used language that clearly gave its actors discretion
rather than imposing substantive predicates that would restrict their
discretion. Although the Court recognized the states' power to define
which interests would and would not receive procedural due process
protection, ° prisoners' civil rights .litigation during the eight years
between Hewitt and Sandin continued to increase. This may reflect
either that states chose not to amend laws and regulations to limit the
scope of prisoners' rights, or that they made amendments that
logically should have decreased the potential subject matter for
litigation, but in fact made no difference."s Regardless, the Court in
Sandin attempted to reassert control over liberty interest creation by
requiring courts to evaluate whether an alleged deprivation is
"atypical and significant."
77. Id. at 473.
78. Id. at 474. Specifically, "[a]n inmate must merely receive some notice of the
charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official
charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation." Id. at
476. Provided that some notice, "[o]rdinarily a written statement by the inmate will
accomplish this purpose," is given and "the decisionmaker reviews the charges and
then-available evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied." Id.
79. See id. at 476 n.8. Four members of the Court would have required additional
procedural safeguards, including the opportunity to be heard in person, through an
oral statement, and the right to a brief, written statement by the decision maker
explaining the reasons for deciding to retain a prisoner in administrative segregation,
assuming that this is the decision taken. See id. at 489-90, 494-95 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 479 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Again,
under the methodology proposed in this Article, an examination of the relevant facts
regarding typicality would be required.
80. Smolla, supra note 10, at 88-94.
81. See Prisoner Petitions, supra note 19, at 2 (reflecting that prisoners' civil rights
cases increased every year from 23,594 in 1987 to 41,679 in 1995).
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II. THE SANDIN DECISION
A. Factual Background
DeMont R. D. Conner filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii while he was a prisoner at the Halawa
Correctional Facility, a maximum security prison in Oahu.82 He
alleged inter alia that he had been improperly subjected to
disciplinary segregation, based on the following series of events.83 A
corrections officer, Gordon Furtado, who was escorting Conner from
his cell to another area of the prison, subjected him to a new strip-
search procedure that Conner felt was abusive and degrading, and
that led to a verbal confrontation between Conner and Furtado.8 4
Furtado filed a misconduct report based on this incident, and the
prison's Adjustment Committee, chaired by Cinda Sandin, the Unit
Team Manager, held a hearing to consider the charges against
Conner. Conner was given notice of the charges against him and an
opportunity to appear at the hearing, but he was not permitted to call
staff witnesses who he contended would exonerate him.86 According
to a form provided to Conner following the hearing, these witnesses
were unavailable "due to the move to the medium facility and being
short staffed on the modules. 8'  The Adjustment Committee found
Conner guilty of a "high misconduct" charge for using physical
interference to obstruct, hinder, or impair a correctional function, and
two "low misconduct" charges for using abusive or obscene language,
and for harassing a prison employee; he received a sentence of 30 days
in disciplinary segregation on the "high" charge and four hours in
disciplinary segregation, to be served concurrently, on the "low"
charges.88 Nine months later, after Conner had already served the 30
82. See Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Brief for Petitioner at 5, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472 (1995) (No. 93-1911).
83. See Conner, 15 F.3d at 1465. Conner also alleged that he had been punished
for praying aloud in Arabic with another inmate, denied access to his legal materials,
denied review of his confinement status, denied a copy of the written prison rules,
confined pursuant to an improperly authorized and illegal "Segregation and
Maximum Custody Program," improperly warned, and retaliated against for being a
jailhouse lawyer. See id. at 1468-71.
84. See Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Sandin (No. 93-1911) (asserting that
according to Furtado's written report, Conner stripped, squatted, put both hands on
the wall, and lifted his feet without incident, but objected to bending over and
spreading his buttocks); see also Brief for Respondent at 3, Sandin (No. 93-1911)
(describing Conner's belief that the strip search procedure was "abusive and
degrading").
85. See Brief for Respondent at 3, Sandin (No. 93-1911).
86. See Conner, 15 F.3d at 1466-67; Brief for Respondent at 3-5, Sandin (No. 93-
1911).
87. Conner, 15 F.3d at 1467.
88. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 475-76; Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, Sandin (No. 93-
1911).
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days, the Deputy Administrator of the prison granted his
administrative appeal, reversing the "high misconduct" finding and
expunging all references to this charge from Conner's record.89
Prior to his disciplinary segregation, Conner had been in the
prison's general population where he was permitted to work and
participate in educational programs, as well as to leave his cell and
interact with other prisoners for eight hours a day.9" While in
disciplinary segregation, by contrast, he spent approximately 23 out of
24 hours a day alone in his cell, and was permitted an average of 50
minutes a day "for brief exercise and shower periods, during which he
nonetheless remained isolated from other inmates and was
constrained by leg irons and waist chains."91 Prisoners in disciplinary
segregation were physically housed in the prison's Special Housing
Unit ("SHU") which consisted of one-person cells; prisoners in
protective custody and administrative segregation were also housed in
SHU.9 2 The restrictions placed on all prisoners in SHU were
"substantially similar," except that those in disciplinary segregation
received one fewer non-legal phone call and family visit per month.93
Part of what separated the majority and dissenting opinions in Sandin
was whether disciplinary segregation was legally different from
protective custody and administrative segregation despite their factual
similarities.94
While his administrative appeal was pending, Conner filed suit
against Sandin, the Adjustment Committee chair, and other prison
officials in federal district court.95 The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of
89. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 476.
90. See id. at 494 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief for Respondent at 2, Sandin (No.
93-1911).
91. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 494 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Brief for Petitioner at
7, Sandin (No. 93-1911).
92. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 476 n.2.
93. See id.; Brief for Petitioner at 7, Sandin (No. 93-1911). According to the
petitioner, prisoners in SHU were locked down in their cells except for one 60-minute
exercise period, five times per week; one ten-minute shower, five times per week; law
library visits; legal and permitted family visits; court appearances; and visits related to
medical and religious needs that could not be met in SHU. See Brief for Petitioner at
8, Sandin (No. 93-1911).
94. Compare Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 ("[D]isciplinary segregation, with
insignificant exceptions, mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in
administrative segregation and protective custody."), with id. at 489 n.1 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("[D]iscipline means punishment for misconduct; it rests on a finding of
wrongdoing that can adversely affect an inmate's parole prospects. Disciplinary
confinement therefore cannot be bracketed with administrative segregation and
protective custody, both measures that carry no long-term consequences."), and id. at
502 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("How can a later decision of prison authorities transform
Conner's segregation for a violation of a specific disciplinary rule into a term of
segregation under the administrative rules? How can a later expungement restore to
Conner the liberty that, in fact, he had already lost?").
95. See id. at 476.
2004]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
Conner's claims,96 but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed as to his claim that "he was improperly subjected to
disciplinary segregation."97  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
relevant state regulation fettered official discretion by requiring either
an admission of guilt or "substantial evidence" of guilt prior to a
finding of guilt. Absent one of these predicates, the prison
disciplinary committee was not authorized to impose disciplinary
segregation.98 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that state law gave rise to a
liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation,99 and that genuine
issues of material fact regarding Conner's due process right to call
witnesses precluded summary judgment."°
B. Majority Opinion
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed."° Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist revisited a series of the Court's
decisions dating back two decades. The Court concluded that federal
courts should abandon the interpretive approach for analyzing due
process claims that had focused solely on parsing state positive law-
an approach which it had established eight years earlier in Hewitt.1"
The Sandin Court started with the Wolff decision, reasoning that it
had found a state-created liberty interest in the good time credits
statutory scheme because the interest at issue, sentence reductions for
96. Conner litigated his case pro se in the district court and circuit courts. In
district court, he amended his complaint twice, first to add additional defendants and
a request for preliminary injunctive relief, and second to add claims that he was being
retaliated against for his activities as a jailhouse lawyer. He won a preliminary
injunction guaranteeing him access to the law library, but his request to be placed in
protective custody to avoid harassment by prison officials and his claims for equitable
relief on Eighth Amendment grounds were denied. See Brief for Petitioner at 16-17,
Sandin (No. 93-1911); Brief for Respondent at 9-10, Sandin (No. 93-1911).
97. Conner, 15 F.3d at 1465 (also reversing summary judgment on Conner's claim
that he was punished for praying aloud in Arabic with a fellow inmate). Conner did
not raise the claim that his religious freedom was impaired in his petition for
certiorari; state officials had repealed the rule under which he was disciplined for
praying in Arabic. See Brief for Respondent at 10, Sandin (No. 93-1911); Brief for
Petitioner at 18-19, Sandin (No. 93-1911).
98. See Conner, 15 F.3d at 1466 (citing Haw. Admin. Rule § 17-201-18(b)(2)
(1983)).
99. See id. (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983); Ky. Dep't of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989)).
100. See Conner, 15 F.3d at 1467 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566
(1974)). Since Conner had specifically identified Sandin as the defendant who had
denied him the right to call witnesses, the appellate court reversed summary judgment
on this claim only with respect to Sandin. See id. at 1467 n.5, 1468.
101. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was joined
by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
wrote dissenting opinions, joined respectively by Justices Stevens and Souter. Id. at
473.
102. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483 n.5. Interestingly, then Justice Rehnquist was also
the author of the Hewitt decision.
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good behavior, was a matter of "real substance" and thus was weighty
enough to warrant liberty interest status.103 In discussing Meachum,
the Sandin Court emphasized the distinction between liberty interests
that stem directly from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and those that are created by state law. 1°4 With respect
to the latter, the Court made clear that "the Due Process Clause does
not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a
substantial adverse impact on the prisoner." ' 5  The Sandin Court
identified Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional
Complex10 6 as a precursor to the Hewitt approach, and characterized
the analytical error in Greenholtz as an overemphasis on a mechanical
dichotomy between discretionary state action and state action that
was mandated by state statute.0 7
The Sandin Court criticized Hewitt for losing sight of the need to
evaluate the "nature" of the interest created by state law.108  In
particular, it indicated that courts should analyze whether an alleged
violation gives rise to a "'grievous loss' of liberty retained even after
[being] sentenced to terms of imprisonment.' 19 Although a prisoner
may develop an expectation of certain treatment in relation to the
conditions of his or her confinement based on state law, the relevant
question for the Court was whether that expectation is legitimate and
enforceable.110 The technical parsing of state law required under
Hewitt did not inevitably lead to a finding of a state-created liberty
103. See id. at 478.
104. See id. at 478-79. Justices Breyer and Souter essentially agreed with the
Sandin Court's description of two categories of liberty interests: first, where the
deprivation is "so severe or so different from ordinary conditions of confinement"
that the state must "comply ... with minimum requirements of due process," and
second, where "the State's rules governing the imposition of that deprivation ... give
the inmate a 'right' to avoid it." Id. at 493 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94 (1980)). The first category involves rights protected
directly under the Due Process Clause, and the second, "deprivations that are less
severe or more closely related to the original terms of confinement," where "state law
(including prison regulations) narrowly cabins the legal power of authorities to
impose the deprivation (thereby giving the inmate a kind of right to avoid it)." Id.
(citing Hewitt, 595 U.S. at 471-72).
105. Id. at 478.
106. 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that a state statute regarding discretionary parole
created a "legitimate expectation" of release under statutorily defined circumstances,
but that the minimal process provided satisfied Fourteenth Amendment
requirements).
107. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 479.
108. See id. at 480 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 480-81; see also id. at 486 n.9 (finding that a "[p]risoner's subjective
expectation[s]" provide "some evidence" regarding whether a deprivation exceeds or
is within the sentence imposed, but are not "dispositive of the liberty interest
analysis").
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interest protected by constitutional due process.' Nevertheless, the
Sandin Court eschewed the perceived effects of Hewitt's methodology:
incentivizing prisoners to "comb regulations in search of mandatory
language on which to base entitlements to various state-conferred
privileges"; creating "disincentives for States to codify prison
management procedures in the interest of uniform treatment" to
avoid inadvertently creating a liberty interest; and causing excessive
"involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of
prisc as" which it characterized as a "squandering [of] judicial
resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone."" 2 According to
Sandin, the shift in analytical focus from the nature of the deprivation
to the language of the state regulation resulted in "negative
implication jurisprudence": where state law required a particular
predicate to justify a particular state action (such as major misconduct
to justify a reduction in good time credits), courts were holding that
the absence of that predicate prohibited that state action (no
reduction in good time credits in the absence of major misconduct)." 3
The Sandin Court also distinguished prison regulations from those
regulations that define the rights and remedies afforded to the general
public on two grounds: first, the purpose of prison regulations is to
guide the actions of prison officials, rather than to create rights for
prisoners;"14 and second, the application of negative implication
jurisprudence leads to the attachment of procedural protections, as
opposed to requiring state action in accordance with the negative
implication." 5 Thus, the effect of the latter would be to create
additional uncertainty and potential litigation regarding what process
is due and whether it had been provided.
Following its critique of Hewitt's methodology and aftermath, the
Sandin Court explicitly sought to turn back the clock: "The time has
come to return to the due process principles we believe were correctly
established and applied in Wolff and Meachum..' . 6 The Court held
that state-created liberty interests are "generally limited to freedom
from restraint which... imposes atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.""1 7 In
111. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1983) (holding that there
was no liberty interest in interstate transfer); Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490
U.S. 454, 464-65 (1989) (holding that there was no liberty interest in visitation).
112. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-82. The Court did not assert or provide any support
for the proposition that state legislatures and administrative agencies had in fact
chosen not to codify procedures in an attempt to avoid potential litigation. Id.
113. See id. at 482.
114. Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). One factor in determining whether a
federal statute gives rise to a private right of action is whether the statute was
intended to benefit the putative plaintiff. Id. at 78.
115. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-82.
116. Id. at 483.
117. Id. at 484 (internal citation omitted). The Sandin Court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the purpose of the state action in question is the analytical key, and
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contrast, the Court characterized the interests protected directly
under the Due Process Clause as those that exceed "the sentence in
such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection."1"8 Other
than providing two specific examples of interests arising directly from
the Due Process Clause, however, the Court provided little guidance
regarding such interests.119
Discounting dicta in Wolff2 ° and Baxter v. Palmigiano"' regarding
the due process protections that should accompany placement in
solitary confinement, the Sandin Court held that the plaintiff's
"discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of
atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably
create a liberty interest." '  It reasoned that since the plaintiff's
disciplinary record was later expunged, his 30-day sentence in
disciplinary segregation was identical, "with insignificant exceptions,"
to non-punitive housing in administrative segregation and protective
custody, and that "the State's actions.., did not work a major
disruption in his environment. 12 3  Furthermore, parole decisions
that actions taken for punitive reasons should give rise to protected liberty interests.
See id. at 484. It distinguished the prohibition on punishment against pre-trial
detainees and school children in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (holding that
due process prohibits the punishment of pretrial detainees), and Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (holding that due process forbids the imposition of arbitrary
corporal punishment on schoolchildren), based on the identity of the party seeking to
assert the due process right and the purpose of the challenged state action. See
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484-85; see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159
(1963) (noting that procedural due process protections apply when the state seeks to
revoke the citizenship of free citizens for draft evasion).
118. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. The Court reasoned that prisoners simply do not
have all of the constitutional rights of people in the free world. "Lawful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights,"
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485 (quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119, 125 (1977)), and punishment within prison "in response to a wide range of
misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of
law." Id.
119. The Court cited to the state action of involuntary transfer to a state mental
hospital, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980), and involuntary injection with
psychotropic drugs, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990), as examples
of deprivations that exceed reasonable expectations about a prison sentence. See
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
120. 418 U.S. 539, 571 n.19 (1974).
121. 425 U.S. 308, 323 (1976).
122. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.
123. Id. Conner's placement in disciplinary segregation did "not present a
dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the plaintiff's] indeterminate
sentence." Id. at 485. The Court noted that Conner had been convicted of murder,
kidnaping, robbery, and burglary, and sentenced to 30 years to life. See id. at 474-75.
It is not clear whether, and if so to what degree, Conner's sentence affected the
Court's analysis of what would constitute "a dramatic departure." See id. at 485; cf.
Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (concluding that
"atypicality also depends in part on the length of the sentence the prisoner is serving"
and holding that "courts must consider not only 'the discipline involved' but also 'the
nature of the prisoner's term of incarceration' in determining 'whether a prisoner's
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"rest[] on a myriad of considerations," and "[t]he chance that a
finding of misconduct will alter the balance is simply too attenuated to
invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause.' '1 24
C. The Ginsburg Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, did not analyze
Conner's due process rights under state law, but instead reasoned that
he "had a liberty interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, in avoiding the disciplinary confinement he
endured., 125 Justice Ginsburg characterized such confinement as a
''severe alteration in the conditions of [plaintiff's] incarceration"
based on the deprivation of privileges, the stigmatizing effect of
disciplinary confinement as opposed to administrative segregation or
protective custody, and the diminution of parole prospects.12 6
Although Conner's record was ultimately expunged, she criticized the
majority opinion's backward looking approach: "[H]indsight cannot
tell us whether a liberty interest existed at the outset. One must, of
course, know at the start the character of the interest at stake in order
to determine then what process, if any, is constitutionally due. 127
Justice Ginsburg concluded, however, that although the disciplinary
confinement gave rise to a liberty interest, based on the record before
the Court, the process provided to Conner was all that was due. 1
28
The prison was not required to permit him to call staff witnesses
because their "projected testimony [was] not relevant."' 129
According to Justice Ginsburg, Conner's liberty interest stemmed
liberty is threatened."' (quoting Franklin v. District of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625, 634
(D.C. Cir. 1998)).
124. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. Finally, the Court pointed out in a footnote that
prisoners were protected from "arbitrary state action" through claims under the First
and Eighth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and in some cases, they additionally had state judicial review and prison
grievance procedures (potential administrative remedies). See id. at 487 n.il.
125. Id. at 488 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 488-89; cf. Monaghan, supra note 16, at 409-10 (noting that the Court's
holding in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), that reputation alone did not implicate a
liberty interest, broke from the prior half century's traditions); Farina, supra note 9, at
193 ("Paul v. Davis repudiated a long line of precedent that had recognized a
Meyeresque [Meyer v. Nebraska] liberty interest in reputation." (emphasis omitted)).
127. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 489 n. 1.
128. See id. at 491. Justice Ginsburg set out her universal theory of how due
process operates, identifying "notice," and "an opportunity to respond" before a
"trustworthy decisionmaker" as the critical components. See id. at 490 (citing
Friendly, supra note 23, at 1278-81).
129. Id. at 491 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974)). Justice
Ginsburg reached this conclusion based on the disciplinary committee's asserted
reliance on Conner's admissions regarding his conduct during the strip search that
preceded his disciplinary confinement. See also id. at 504 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf.
Fallon, supra note 15, at 339-55 (discussing doctrine established in Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527 (1981) (holding that where pre-deprivation process is not feasible,
adequate state post-deprivation remedies preclude a federal due process claim)).
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directly from the Due Process Clause as opposed to the State's prison
code.130 She reasoned that deriving liberty interests from state law
would lead to the anomalous result that constitutional liberty interests
that are described as being fundamental and unalienable might differ
from state to state.13 1 Moreover, she asserted that the methodology of
state-created liberty interests creates an "incentive for ruleless prison
management." '132 Finally, she criticized the "'atypical and significant"'
standard articulated by the majority as providing no real guidance
regarding when state-created liberty interests arise.133  Justice
Ginsburg's dissent raises important questions about the nature of due
process interests and the Court's failure to provide more concrete
instruction to the lower courts.
D. The Breyer Dissent
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, dissented because he
believed that a fair application of the "atypical and significant.., in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" test articulated by the
majority would lead to the conclusion that placing Conner in
disciplinary segregation did deprive him of a constitutionally
protected liberty interest.' Like Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer
concluded that placing a prisoner in disciplinary segregation for 30
days deprived him of liberty protected directly by the Due Process
Clause. Unlike Justice Ginsburg, however, he found that this
punishment violated the plaintiff's state-created liberty interest, based
on prison disciplinary rules that "severely cabin the authority of
prison officials to impose this kind of punishment."' 35
Justice Breyer attempted to explain and elaborate on Hewitt's
approach by constructing a framework of three categories of
deprivations that would harmonize the majority opinion in Sandin
with then current doctrine. The first category consisted of those
deprivations of a prisoner's freedom that warrant due process
protection regardless of state law.136 The second covered "a broad
130. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 489.
131. See id. My proposal addresses this concern over time. Although the process
initially due to a prisoner in one state may differ from that due to a prisoner in
another state, once the federal courts have analyzed their state's empirical practices
and positive law, and created a sufficient body of common law, a prisoner in an outlier
state which fails to provide protections provided in the other 49 states could argue
successfully for the process due under a uniform national standard.
132. Id. at 490; see also Herman, supra note 10, at 1255 n.123 ("Jurisdictions are
encouraged to avoid the courts' imposition of procedure in the only way they can-by
retaining the authority to act arbitrarily, thereby avoiding creating a liberty
interest.").
133. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 490 n.2.
134. Id. at 491-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 494.
136. These deprivations "are so severe in kind or degree (or so far removed from
the original terms of confinement) that they amount to deprivations of liberty,
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middle category of imposed restraints or deprivations that, considered
by themselves, are neither obviously so serious as to fall within, nor
obviously so insignificant as to fall without, the Clause's protection.' 3 7
The third category was comprised of de minimis deprivations that
clearly do not warrant due process protection, regardless of the
existence of governing state law.'38 According to Justice Breyer,
Hewitt's approach of examining whether "local law creates a 'liberty'
by significantly limiting the discretion of local authorities to impose a
restraint," can provide a touchstone for determining whether there is
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the middle category of
cases. 139
Justice Breyer described the benefits of using Hewitt's "discretion-
cabining" approach in the middle category as follows: The existence of
a discretion-cabining local rule suggests that the matter is more likely
"to have played an important role in the life of the inmate,... of a
kind to which procedural protections historically have applied, and
where they normally prove useful."'40 In addition, the existence of
such a rule indicates that the matter does "not involve highly
judgmental administrative matters that call for the wise exercise of
discretion," and that "the inmate will have thought that he himself,
through control of his own behavior, could have avoided the
deprivation, and thereby have believed that (in the absence of his
misbehavior) the restraint fell outside the 'sentence imposed' upon
him." '14 1 In other words, a governmental restraint or deprivation that
is subject to such a rule is likely to hold particular significance from an
inmate's point of view and to warrant procedural protections from a
prison official's point of view. According to Justice Breyer, the task of
identifying discretion-cabining rules can be done "fairly easily and
objectively."' 42 He predicted that courts would "continue to find this
touchstone helpful as they seek to apply the majority's middle
category standard."'43
irrespective of whether state law (or prison rules) 'cabin discretion."' Id. at 497
(citations omitted).
137. Id.
138. See id. at 499.
139. Id. at 497. Justice Breyer distinguished between using local law to help
determine whether there is a due process interest in property as opposed to liberty.
See id. at 497-98. Whereas property involves the protection of "reliance upon an
'entitlement' that local (i.e., nonconstitutional) law itself has created or helped to
define," id. at 497 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)), liberty
"protects, not this kind of reliance upon a government-conferred benefit, but rather
an absence of government restraint." Id. at 498.
140. Id. at 498.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 498-99.
143. Id. at 499. This prediction has proven true insofar as the majority of circuits
continue to rely on a Hewitt analysis of state law. See infra Part IV, text accompanying
notes 253-57. With respect to the specific facts presented in Sandin, Justice Breyer
reasoned that under the "atypical and significant" test articulated by the majority,
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He further harmonized Hewitt and Sandin by interpreting the
''atypical and significant" threshold as being equivalent to the upper
limit of the third de minimis category.'" Recognizing that prisons
intentionally restrict prisoners' freedom, he asserted that the task of
distinguishing between the second and third categories ("the
unimportant from the potentially significant") is "no more difficult
than many other judicial tasks." '45 My proposal would interpret the
significance prong of the Sandin test as a de minimis test in the first
instance. Thus, I would require an examination of typicality based on
state practices, of state positive law, and potentially a further review
of significance if the alleged deprivation passed an initial de minimus
hurdle.
III. POST-SANDIN DEVELOPMENTS
A. Supreme Court Case Law
The five Supreme Court cases that have cited to Sandin shed little
light on how typicality should be applied. In Ohio Adult Parole
Authority v. Woodard,46 the Court considered a death row prisoner's
challenge to Ohio's clemency process under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment. 147  The
Court drew conclusions about typicality and significance, but
conducted no analysis of the state's clemency practices. It held that
although the prisoner had a "residual life interest" in avoiding
Conner had suffered a significant deprivation despite (1) the similarity between
conditions in disciplinary segregation and administrative segregation or protective
custody, and (2) the broad discretion granted to prison officials in imposing the latter
two forms of non-punitive segregation. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 501-02. Unconvinced
by the majority's reliance on the expungement of Conner's disciplinary record, he
concluded that, in contrast to the broad rules governing non-punitive segregation, the
state disciplinary rules "do cabin official discretion sufficiently" to give rise to a state-
created liberty interest. See id. at 502.
144. See id. at 499 (stating that a deprivation that "is unimportant enough (or so
similar in nature to ordinary imprisonment) that it rather clearly falls outside that
middle category").
145. Id. at 500 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (relying on "de
minimis" line to define property interests)). Thus, according to Justice Breyer,
filtering out the bottom layer of de minimis due process cases such as those
challenging a deprivation of "television privileges, 'sack' versus 'tray' lunches, playing
the state lottery, attending an ex-stepfather's funeral, or the limits of travel when on
prison furlough," does not call for a type of analysis that is categorically more difficult
or different. Id. (citations omitted).
146. 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
147. See id. at 277. When the Ohio Adult Parole Authority notified prisoner,
Eugene Woodard that he could have a clemency interview one week before his
clemency hearing, Woodard objected to the short notice and asked that his attorney
be permitted to participate in the interview and hearing process. See id. After
receiving no response to his request, Woodard filed suit in federal court asserting that
his rights to due process and to remain silent had been violated. See id.
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summary execution by prison guards, he had no due process right
stemming directly from the Fourteenth Amendment to any particular
clemency procedures.148 It similarly held that Ohio's "mandatory
clemency application and review procedures" did not give rise to a
state-created protected interest since, ultimately, Ohio's Governor
retained broad discretion to grant or deny clemency. 149  The Court
asserted that "the availability of clemency, or the manner in which the
State conducts clemency proceedings, does not impose [an] 'atypical
and significant hardship"' because "denial of clemency merely means
that the inmate must serve the sentence originally imposed.""15
In a challenge to removal from a state pre-parole program, the
Court signaled that it might consider evidence of actual state
practices, 5' and even cited to state positive law,152 but ultimately held
that the Due Process Clause itself mandated procedural due process
protection. In Young v. Harper,5 3 the Court rejected the state's
148. See id. at 280-82. The Court reasoned that this claim was barred by
Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981), which held that
"an inmate has 'no constitutional or inherent right' to commutation of his sentence."
Id. at 280. Likewise, the prisoner here had no "protected life or liberty interest in the
[clemency] application process," and no "protected interest in process itself, which is
not a cognizable claim." Id. at 279-80 n.2. The Court distinguished the holding in
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 425 (1986), prohibiting the execution of a person
who became insane after trial, based on the "substantive constitutional prohibition"
under the Eighth Amendment against such executions and consequent due process
protections. See id. at 281 n.3.
149. See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 282. The Court characterized a petition for
clemency as a "unilateral hope," as opposed to a protected life or liberty interest. See
id.
150. Id. at 283 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). In examining a strand of due
process analysis, the Woodard Court distinguished Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396
(1985) (holding that a prisoner has a constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel on a first appeal as of right), on the grounds that clemency is not a part of the
process of determining guilt or innocence, but rather "a matter of grace." See id. at
285. According to the Court, the decision to impose the death penalty "has already
been made with all required due process protections." Id. at 285 n.5. Finally, what the
Sixth Circuit characterized as a "Hobson's choice" between asserting a Fifth
Amendment right and participating in the clemency interview, see id. at 279 (citing
Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 107 F.3d 1178, 1189 (6th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 523
U.S. 272 (1998)), the Supreme Court held to be a permissible choice similar to other
choices a criminal defendant must make, and thus not contrary to the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. See id. at 286-87.
151. The state claimed that "preparolees were always reincarcerated if the
Governor denied them parole," but the Court discounted this assertion "[i]n the
absence of evidence to this effect," and relied on the written rules and conditions of
pre-parole release. See Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 151 (1997).
152. See, e.g., id. at 145-46, 151 & n.3 (citing to written rules and conditions of pre-
parole release); cf. McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002)
("California's parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on
parole."); Ellis v. District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1417-18 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating
that a liberty interest in parole survives Sandin).
153. 520 U.S. 143 (1997). Plaintiff Ernest Eugene Harper had been released on
pre-parole by the Pardon and Parole Board which had simultaneously recommended
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argument that removal from pre-parole was analogous to an intrastate
prison transfer and thus did not trigger procedural protections. It
described the plaintiff's participation in pre-parole as follows: "He
kept his own residence; he sought, obtained, and maintained a job;
and he lived a life generally free of the incidents of imprisonment. 1 54
The Court held that since pre-parole differed from parole in name
alone, the procedural protections outlined in Morrissey v. Brewer
55
were required.156
In McKune v. Lile,157 a plurality of the Court applied the "atypical
and significant" test to a prisoner's Fifth Amendment challenge to
participation in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program ("SATP") that
required him to provide a complete sexual history, including details of
any uncharged criminal offenses. 5 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy concluded that the choice between losing prison privileges159
for not participating in SATP, and "accept[ing] responsibility" by
providing the required information did not constitute unconstitutional
compulsion. 6 ° Although Justice O'Connor agreed that the plaintiff
was not unconstitutionally compelled, she concurred rather than
joining the plurality opinion. She agreed with the dissenting Justices
"that the Fifth Amendment compulsion standard is broader than the
'atypical and significant hardship' standard we have adopted for
evaluating due process claims in prisons.'' 6. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Stevens made no mention of the Sandin decision.'62 Thus, five
him for parole. After five months in pre-parole, the Governor denied him parole, and
Harper was reincarcerated. See id. at 145-46.
154. Id. at 148.
155. 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see also supra note 41.
156. See Young, 520 U.S. at 152-53.
157. 536 U.S. 24 (2002).
158. See id. at 30, 35-37.
159. The loss included a curtailment of "visitation rights, earnings, work
opportunities, ability to send money to family, canteen expenditures, [and] access to a
personal television," as well as transfer "to a maximum-security unit, where his
movement would be more limited, he would be moved from a two-person to a four-
person cell, and he would be in a potentially more dangerous environment." Id. at 31;
see also id. at 67 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens described the potential loss as:
the difference between being housed in a four-person, maximum-security
cell in the most dangerous area of the prison, on the one hand, and having a
key to one's own room, the right to take a shower, and the ability to move
freely within adjacent areas during certain hours, on the other.... [as well
as] visitation privileges, being able to send more than $30 per pay period to
family, having access to the yard for exercise, and the opportunity to
participate in group activities.
Id.
160. See id. at 45 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 52-53 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
161. Id. at 48 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 51 ("I do not agree that the
standard for compulsion is the same as the due process standard we identified in
Sandin v. Conner.").
162. See id. at 54-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justices rejected the importation of the "atypical and significant" test
to the realm of protection against self-incrimination. 63
Although the plurality asserted that "[t]he Sandin framework
provides a reasonable means of assessing whether the response of
prison administrators to correctional and rehabilitative necessities are
so out of the ordinary that one could sensibly say they rise to the level
of unconstitutional compulsion,""M it provided no further guidance as
to what this framework would entail.165 The two remaining cases
merely cite Sandin in passing. 166 In sum, the Supreme Court has left to
the lower courts the work of determining how to apply the analytical
tools of typicality and significance, and whether to consider state
positive law.
B. Circuit Court Case Law
The circuit courts have, not surprisingly, been fractured in their
application of Sandin.67  No court has explicitly required an
examination of actual state practices in conjunction with significance
and state law or adopted the balancing test proposed here, but some
circuits have used elements of this test. A sampling of cases, as
opposed to an exhaustive survey, 16 reveals that the Second and
District of Columbia Circuits employ the most factually rigorous test
and come closest to employing the typicality analysis that I propose.
163. Cf Searcy v. Simmons, 299 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Because Justice
O'Connor based her conclusion on the narrower ground that the KDOC's policy was
not compulsion under the Fifth Amendment, we view her concurrence as the holding
of the Court in McKune." (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977))).
164. McKune, 536 U.S. at 26 (plurality opinion).
165. With respect to unconstitutional compulsion, the Court suggested that the
Fifth Amendment standard may collapse into the Eighth Amendment: "Courts must
decide whether the consequences of an inmate's choice to remain silent are closer to
the physical torture against which the Constitution clearly protects or the de minimis
harms against which it does not." Id.
166. In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), the Court referred to Sandin as an
example of a pro se case in which the prisoner plaintiff used court-provided forms, see
id. at 352, and the concurring opinion cited to it in support of the argument that state
administrators need flexibility "to make reasonable judgments on short notice under
difficult circumstances." Id. at 385 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Overton v. Bazzetta,
123 S. Ct. 2162 (2003), the Court cited to Sandin in support of its conclusion that a
visitation restriction for prisoners with two substance-abuse violations was not cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 2170 ("Withdrawal
of visitation privileges for a limited period ... is not a dramatic departure from
accepted standards for conditions of confinement.").
167. In contrast to the dearth of attention at the Supreme Court level, over 1,000
circuit court cases have cited to Sandin. On January 17, 2004, a Westlaw KeyCite
search revealed that 1,058 circuit court cases had cited Sandin.
168. Research for this Article included the reported cases that Westlaw identified
as containing a significant discussion of Sandin. Amy E. Sloan, Basic Legal Research:
Tools and Strategies 134 (2000) ("There are four star categories: (a) examined (four
stars); (b) discussed (three stars); (c) cited (two stars); and (d) mentioned (one
star)."). I reviewed those cases decided before March 27, 2003 which were marked
with three or four stars, indicating that they had "examined" or "discussed" Sandin.
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In contrast, the Third and Seventh Circuits take a case law based
approach that is not grounded in empirical evidence. The
methodology for analyzing prisoners' due process claims in the
remaining circuits is not as clearly articulated or developed. In
general, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits provide a
more narrow and cursory review of these claims, while the Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits provide a more widespread application
and broad interpretation of Sandin.169 Both the narrow and broad
approaches reflect more of an outcome-based analysis than a
principled methodology. 7  After describing each of the four
categories outlined above, I evaluate them along three continua:
ease/difficulty of application, consistency/unpredictability of
outcomes, and integrity/incoherence of approach.
1. A Fact-Based Approach
The Second and District of Columbia Circuits have developed a
fact-intensive approach to applying the Sandin test by virtue of having
seriously considered the issue of what constitutes an "atypical and
significant" hardship.17' The Second Circuit's decision in Welch v.
169. As of January 17, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit had decided only 5 cases that
cited Sandin and the First Circuit had decided 23. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit had
decided more cases that cited Sandin, 255, than any other circuit. The Eighth Circuit
was in the middle range with 44 cases that had cited Sandin, and the Tenth Circuit was
fourth in terms of circuit court cases that cited Sandin with 136 cases. The remaining
numbers are as follows: Second Circuit (95), Third Circuit (17), Fourth Circuit (23),
Fifth Circuit (27), Seventh Circuit (156), Ninth Circuit (245), D.C. Circuit (28), and
Federal (4).
170. One apparent commonality among the circuits is that they all appear to apply
the Sandin test retroactively. Pursuant to the rule in Harper v. Virginia Department of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), requiring that a Supreme Court decision "must be given
full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events,
regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule,"
id. at 97, the Sandin standard should apply retroactively to cases that were pending at
the time it was decided regardless of whether the events underlying the case predated
the decision. See Rodgers v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 1998); accord
Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997); Driscoll v. Youngman, 105 F.3d
393, 394 (8th Cir. 1997); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1413 (10th Cir. 1996); Frazier v.
Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313, 317 (2d Cir. 1996); Dominique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1160 n.6
(1st Cir. 1996); Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995).
171. These circuits considered how to define the comparative baseline for
determining the existence of a state-created liberty interest. For example, how
frequently must a particular deprivation occur to be considered typical? Should a
plaintiff's circumstances be compared to prisoners within his or her prison, within the
state, or throughout the United States? Should a prisoner's criminal sentence factor
into what is typical? For example, might the same deprivation be deemed atypical for
a prisoner serving less than a year, but typical for a prisoner serving a life sentence
without the possibility of parole? Because prisoners' due process cases often involve
challenges to segregative housing assignments, these circuits considered other
baseline questions such as what is the appropriate housing status (general population,
administrative segregation, protective custody, or disciplinary segregation) for
comparison. And, does the defendant's purpose for imposing the deprivation
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Bartlett172 is illustrative of this approach. In Welch, plaintiff Elbert
Welch appealed a second time from the grant of summary judgment
against him on his claim that he was placed in disciplinary
confinement in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") for ninety days
without due process of law. The Second Circuit had once before
remanded the case for "findings as to the nature and duration of
Welch's disciplinary confinement compared to the ordinary conditions
of prison life." '173  On remand, defendants submitted affidavits
regarding the conditions in SHU and in the general population, 74 and
statistics regarding the duration and frequency of punitive SHU
placements. 75 The defendants' statistics regarding the total number
and percentage of prisoners who had received SHU punishment,
however, implicitly assumed the normalcy of such punishment and
provided a skewed comparative baseline. 76 The statistics should have
included consideration of the "deprivation typically endured by other
prisoners in the ordinary course of prison administration, including
(administrative, punitive, inadvertence, or malice) make a difference? See generally
Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 1999) (outlining analytical factors in
considering challenge to a 101-day confinement in administrative segregation); Hatch
v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 847, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (focusing on the
question of what constitutes the "ordinary incidents of prison life" and concluding
that both the nature and length of the deprivation, as well as the plaintiff's sentence
must be evaluated); Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163, 169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that
it was unclear "which prison or part of prison is to provide the standard of
comparison," and whether courts must consider the length of the segregation and
compare conditions in segregation with conditions in general population) (citing
Brooks v. DiFasi, 112 F.3d 46, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1997); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089
(9th Cir. 1996)).
172. 196 F.3d 389 (2d Cir. 1999).
173. Id. at 391 (citing Welch v. Bartlett, No. 96-2778, 1997 WL 568660 (2d Cir. Sept.
12, 1997)); see also Brown, 131 F.3d at 170 (noting split in circuits regarding the need
for fact-finding) (citing Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1997))
(remanding for specific findings in challenge to six-month administrative segregation);
Mackey, 111 F.3d at 463 (holding that six-month administrative segregation was not
"atypical and significant" without discussion of conditions).
174. These affidavits indicated that SHU prisoners were locked down in their cells
except for one hour of exercise per day, two showers per week, legal visits, one non-
legal visit per week, and appointments with medical or other staff, as compared to
general population prisoners who spend about half of the day locked down, and are
released from their cells to participate in educational or vocational programming,
counseling, and other activities. See Welch, 196 F.3d at 391-92.
175. "[O]ut of 215,701 inmates spending time at a DOCS facility between 1991 and
1996, a total of 19,963 were penalized with SHU confinement at least once... almost
10% of all inmates received SHU punishment," and of "the prisoners confined to the
SHU, 40% were confined for less than 90 days, and about 60% for 90 days or more."
Id. at 392. The Welch court implicitly assumed that the appropriate geographic scope
was within New York State. Cf. Hatch, 184 F.3d at 856-58 (holding that appropriate
geographic scope should be determined in reference to the possibility of a transfer to
a more restrictive prison and the likelihood of such a transfer, i.e., a "substantial
chance of [... ] occurrence," as opposed to "more probable than not"); Wagner v.
Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that the comparison should be
with the state's and perhaps the nation's most rigorous prison).
176. See Welch, 196 F.3d at 394.
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general population prisoners and those in various forms of
administrative and protective custody," not just prisoners who had
been subjected to disciplinary segregation.77 Thus, knowing that
more than half of SHU sentences are more than ninety days "does not
tell whether Welch's deprivation was more serious than typically
endured by prisoners as an ordinary incident of prison life."' 78
The court additionally reasoned that the defendants had failed to
address allegations in Welch's affidavit that hygiene conditions in
SHU were far worse than in general population,179 and it asserted that
the difference between twenty-three hours a day in one's cell when in
SHU as compared to half a day when in general population "seems to
us to be great.' 180 Furthermore, to the extent that prisoners' access to
177. Id. (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995)). In contrast, in Hatch v.
District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the D.C. Circuit parsed the
language and facts of the Sandin decision and rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the appropriate baseline is general population, the form of confinement that prison
officials had "unfettered discretion" to impose. Id. at 855. Although the Sandin Court
had referred to the fact that "Conner's confinement did not exceed similar, but totally
discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree of restriction," 515 U.S. at
486, the Hatch court examined the Hawaii regulations governing the confinement
referred to (administrative segregation and protective custody), and concluded that
such placements were not totally discretionary. See 184 F.3d at 855 (citing Haw.
Admin. Rule §§ 17-201-22, 17-201-23 (1983)). It reasoned that since administrative
segregation functioned as a "'catchall,' a flexible management tool for ensuring safety
and good order in prison," and was routinely imposed for prison management rather
than punitive reasons, the Sandin decision mandated that conditions in administrative
segregation form the comparative baseline. Id at 855-56. In other words, "due
process is required when segregative confinement imposes an 'atypical and significant
hardship' on an inmate in relation to the most restrictive conditions that prison
officials, exercising their administrative authority to ensure institutional safety and
good order, routinely impose on inmates serving similar sentences." Id. at 847.
178. Welch, 196 F.3d at 394.
179. See id. at 393. The plaintiff alleged that SHU prisoners "receive inadequate
amounts of toilet paper, soap and cleaning materials, a filthy mattress, and infrequent
changes of clothes." Id.
180. Id. By way of comparison, in Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
plaintiff Ernest Brown raised a due process challenge to his placement in
administrative segregation for ten months. Id. at 165. Brown was charged with
disciplinary offenses for throwing an unknown substance and threatening a guard, and
given notice the following day that a disciplinary hearing had been scheduled. Id. at
165-66. That same day, however, he was transferred to administrative segregation at
a new facility where the Housing Board held a hearing, for which the plaintiff was not
given advance notice, and continued Brown's administrative segregation for ten
months. Id. at 166. Before his placement in administrative segregation, Brown "had
been able to go outdoors from 8 a.m. to dusk, was permitted to move about the
dormitory and interact with other inmates at all hours of the day or night, and could
participate in many prison programs." Id. After his placement and transfer to a
maximum-security facility, for the first four months, "he was in solitary confinement,
and was allowed to leave his cell only to meet with visitors (while shackled,
handcuffed, and belly-chained), and for two hours a week of exercise in a hallway."
Id. For the remainder of his segregation, Brown "was in solitary confinement, but
was allowed to leave his cell for two or three hours a day." Id.
Although Brown examined the three possible baselines that the Sandin Court
may have used (conditions in administrative segregation and protective custody at the
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programs while in general population may be restricted, there was no
showing "either that such limitations occur with sufficient regularity to
be considered typical, or that the severity of the conditions faced by a
prisoner experiencing such limitations on his programs is
comparable."'81 Since "[t]he record [did] not reveal whether it [was]
typical for inmates not being disciplined to spend similar periods of
time in similar circumstances," the Second Circuit once again
remanded for further proceedings.182
As demonstrated in Welch, the fact-based approach is potentially
particular prison at issue, conditions in general population at that prison; and a
standard keyed to Conner's criminal sentence, the "range of confinement to be
normally expected for one serving an indeterminate term of 30 years to life"), see
Brown, 131 F.3d at 169 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87), the Brown court ultimately
remanded with instructions to first decide the more narrow factual issue of whether
Brown had received the process that was due. See id. at 165.
181. Welch, 196 F.3d at 393-94 (citing Lee v. Coughlin, 26 F. Supp. 2d 615, 618-29
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (setting out comparative statistics and describing conditions in
various forms of confinements)).
182. See id. at 394-95; cf. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996)
(remanding plaintiff's due process challenge to six-month placement in administrative
segregation for comparison between conditions in the general and segregated
populations, and noting that the likely effect on the duration of sentence and the
duration of the segregation sentence itself were relevant). But see Luken v. Scott, 71
F.3d 192, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1995) (not discussing length of or conditions in segregation).
Since it remanded for further consideration of typicality, the Welch court did
not reach the second step question of what process is due. In Brown, the court
explained what process is due prior to placement in administrative segregation:
An inmate must merely receive some notice of the charges against him and
an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with
deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation .... So long
as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and the then-
available evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied.
Id. at 170 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1982)); see also Hatch v.
District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (concluding that the
minimum requirements of "some notice," "an opportunity to present his views" to the
person making the segregation decision, and consideration of the prisoner's evidence
"within a reasonable time" had not been met (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476 & n.8)).
Brown maintained that he was entitled to advance notice of the Housing Board's
hearing as required under applicable D.C. law, namely D.C. Municipal Register title
28, section 523.1 (1987), but the court held that: "[s]tate law supplies only the
substance of a liberty interest; federal constitutional law governs the procedures that
are required when it is withdrawn." Brown, 131 F.3d at 171 n.9 (citing Archie v. City
of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)). According to the court,
moreover, the required time frame for notice of the hearing is within a reasonable
time after such placement; the process can be in writing or done orally; and periodic
reviews are required. See id. at 170 (citing Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476). Although a
Housing Board hearing was held, it was not clear what had occurred at the hearing.
The court concluded that "ji]f Brown was not provided an accurate picture of what
was at stake in the hearing, then he was not given his due process." Id. at 172 (citing
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978); Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950)). The record of the Housing
Board hearing indicates that Brown stated that "he does not fear for his safety and
that he wants to have access to a law library," which may suggest that he believed the
hearing was about potentially placing him in protective custody. Id. at 171.
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difficult to apply. Following the first remand, the lower court and
litigants attempted to conduct the requisite fact-finding, and the
defendant Department of Corrections provided statewide statistical
information. The Second Circuit held, however, that the defendants'
use of disciplinary segregation as a typicality baseline was too narrow,
and it instructed them to include an analysis of prisoners in other
forms of non-punitive housing, including general population." 3
Although discovery and resource issues obviously contribute to the
difficulty of using this methodology," over time, as courts better
understand what kind of fact-finding is necessary, some of the initial
"start-up" costs should dissipate. Moreover, using this approach
should contribute to greater consistency in result. Setting aside the
inevitable variation that arises when individual judges decide
individual disputes, anchoring typicality determinations in empirical
evidence should lead to greater uniformity. Finally, a fact-based
approach represents a principled manner of making determinations
that might otherwise be subjective and overly dependent on how well
a particular case happened to have been litigated.
2. A Law-Based Approach
In contrast to the Second Circuit and the District of Columbia
Circuit, the Third Circuit and to a lesser degree the Seventh Circuit
have relied on case law rather than factual development in making
liberty interest determinations. An examination of the following
three cases from the Third Circuit demonstrates how this approach
evolved and operates. In the earliest case, Griffin v. Vaughn,"5
plaintiff Jerome Griffin challenged his placement in administrative
custody for fifteen months without a hearing.1 16 The court asserted
that: "[T]he baseline for determining what is 'atypical and
significant'-the 'ordinary incidents of prison life'-is ascertained by
what a sentenced inmate may reasonably expect to encounter as a
result of his or her conviction in accordance with due process of
law."' 87  It reviewed the state regulations governing conditions in
administrative custody, 18  and relied on regulatory language
183. The D.C. Circuit has disagreed with the Second Circuit's assertion that general
population should be considered as part of the baseline, and has maintained that
administrative segregation should be used. See Hatch, 184 F.3d at 847, 855-56.
184. These issues are discussed at greater length in Section IV.B. infra.
185. 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997).
186. Id. at 705. Griffin was under investigation following an incident in which a
female guard had been beaten and raped by a male prisoner. Id.
187. Id. at 706. The court did not, however, provide any guidance with respect to
what kind of confinement should be reasonably expected, or address what frequency
or length of segregation, or what geographic scope should be employed as a baseline.
188. See id. at 706-08. These regulations defined administrative custody as a
"status of confinement for nondisciplinary reasons which provides closer supervision,
control, and protection than is provided in general population." Id. at 706. Under the
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permitting placement in administrative custody for a range of ten
different reasons.189  Without any empirical data regarding the
numbers of inmates actually placed in administrative custody, or the
average lengths of such confinement, the court simply declared that:
[I]t is not extraordinary for inmates in a myriad of circumstances to
find themselves exposed to the conditions to which Griffin was
subjected. It is also apparent that it is not atypical for inmates to be
exposed to those conditions, like Griffin, for a substantial period of
time. Given the considerations that lead to transfers to
administrative custody of inmates at risk from others, inmates at risk
from themselves, and inmates deemed to be security risks, etc., one
can conclude with confidence that stays of many months are not
uncommon.
190
Since the court held that the plaintiff's placement in administrative
custody for fifteen months did not deprive him of a liberty interest, he
was not entitled to any procedural due process protections. 191
In the second case, Fraise v. Terhune,'g three plaintiffs challenged a
state policy allowing prison officials to transfer designated gang
regulations, conditions in administrative custody include a limitation of non-legal
visits to one per week, a limitation to one hour of exercise per day, five days per
week; and a limitation of three showers per week. Id. at 707. It is not clear how many
hours per day an inmate in administrative custody was locked down in his cell as
compared to an inmate in general population.
189. See id. at 707-08. The cited regulation provided that an inmate "may be
transferred from general population to administrative custody by order of the shift
commander" for any one of ten enumerated reasons, including, among others, posing
a danger to someone else or himself/herself, requiring protection from the general
population, constituting an escape risk, and awaiting classification or lacking
documentation regarding custody level, as well as being charged with or under
investigation for a rule violation. See id. at 707-08; see also Asquith v. Dep't of Corr.,
186 F.3d 407, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999) (relying on state regulations permitting expulsion
from a community release program based on a charge of a major violation in holding
that the plaintiff had no liberty interest in remaining in such a program) (citing N.J.
Admin. Code tit. 10A §§ 1OA:20-4.21, 1OA:20-4.2 (year omitted)).
190. Griffin, 112 F.3d at 708. The court may have sub silentio taken judicial notice
of what it deemed "apparent" and what constituted a "substantial period of time" in
expressing confidence that "stays of many months are not uncommon"; it did not
indicate that any factual basis for these conclusions was necessary. Id.
191. Id. The plaintiff cited to mandatory language in the regulations indicating that
following twenty days of confinement in administrative custody for investigative
purposes, "the inmate must be charged with a misconduct and a subsequent hearing
held within six days if the inmate is not to be released to population." Id. The court
assumed that Griffin had some remedy in state court, but maintained that unless the
state law at issue confers a liberty interest in avoiding an atypical and significant
restraint, there is no procedural due process right. See id.; see also id. at 709 (citing
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Sandin instructs that placement
in administrative confinement will generally not create a liberty interest."); Pichardo
v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that administrative confinement
alone does not deprive inmates of a liberty interest); Taylor v. Reynolds, 76 F.3d 380
(6th Cir. 1996) (holding that administrative segregation is not atypical and
significant)).
192. 283 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2002).
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members to a "Security Threat Group Management Unit"
("STGMU") where they were required to participate in a behavior
modification program in order to return to the general prison
population. 93 The court held that the "plaintiffs were not subjected to
confinement that exceeded the sentences imposed upon them or that
otherwise violated the Constitution, and therefore no liberty interest
created by the Due Process Clause itself was impinged.' 94 Relying on
Griffin and case law from other circuits, the court further held that the
placement in administrative segregation was not atypical and
significant.'95
In Torres v. Fauver,'96 plaintiff Antonio Torres, a former state
prisoner, alleged that his prison disciplinary conviction on an escape
charge and sentence of fifteen days in disciplinary detention and 120
days in administrative segregation violated his due process rights
because the disciplinary charge was not supported by substantial
evidence.'97 With respect to liberty interests arising from the Due
193. See id. at 509. The "three-phase behavior modification and education
program" consisted of instruction in "anger management, conflict resolution, and
social interactive skills that feature alternatives to violence." Id. at 511 (citation
omitted).
194. Id. at 522. Plaintiffs also challenged their STGMU placement under the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the
court affirmed the decision below granting summary judgment for the defendants.
See id. at 515-23.
195. See id. at 523 (citing Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-08 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that 15 months was not atypical and significant); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d
810, 813 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that two and one-half years was not atypical and
significant); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
placement in administrative segregation was not atypical and significant); see also
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 652-53 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff's seven-
month placement in disciplinary segregation, without the violation of an additional
constitutional right such as access to courts, did not implicate a liberty interest and
thus did not violate due process). The Smith court did not analyze or even describe
the conditions in the STGMU.
In her opinion in Fraise, Judge Rendell set forth some of the written
restrictions (as opposed to actual conditions) on inmates in Phase 1 of the STGMU
program:
[S]trip-searches each time they leave or return to their cells; a total of five
hours per week out of their cells; a shower or shave only every third day;
only a single, non-contact visit each month; only one monitored phone call
per week; prohibition on correspondence with any other inmate, including
incarcerated family members; all meals eaten in cells; and no access to
regular prison programs.
283 F.3d at 523 n.1 (Rendell, J., dissenting on other grounds) (citation omitted).
Finally, the court held that even if STGMU placement had imposed an atypical and
significant hardship and given rise to a liberty interest, the procedures provided
satisfied the requirements of due process. See id. at 523. These practices entailed
notice and a hearing during which the inmate could be heard, as well as an
administrative appeal and state court judicial review. See id.; see also id. at 530 n.13
(Rendell, J., dissenting) ("I will not provide my own reasoning regarding Appellants'
due process claim, as I agree with that provided by the majority.").
196. 292 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2002).
197. See id. at 142-44. Following a classification committee hearing during which
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Process Clause itself, the court held that Torres' transfer to "'less
amenable and more restrictive quarters' did not implicate a liberty
interest" since a prisoner should "reasonably anticipate" being placed
in disciplinary detention and administrative segregation.19 As for
state-created liberty interests, the court asserted that "Sandin instructs
that whether the restraint at issue 'imposes atypical and significant
hardship' depends on the particular state in which the plaintiff is
incarcerated."199
The Torres court then asserted that the Fraise decision, rendering
placement in the STGMU essentially immune from due process
challenge as a matter of law, was dispositive.2 °° The court ignored the
length of Torres' administrative segregation in light of the legality of
potentially indefinite STGMU placements.2" It similarly failed to
he was granted placement in a minimum security prison, Torres, a paranoid
schizophrenic, became convinced that his new placement would harm him, and asked
the guard escorting him from the hearing if he could ask the committee to reconsider.
After the guard refused, Torres said that if he were placed in the minimum security
prison, he would try to escape. The guard charged him with attempting to plan an
escape, and Torres was placed in pre-hearing detention. A staff psychologist later
met with Torres and determined that he could return to the general population.
Torres was found guilty at his disciplinary hearing and sentenced to detention, but his
good-time credits were not revoked, and he was referred for a psychological
evaluation. See id. at 143-44. Torres filed an administrative appeal, which was
denied, but he did not appeal to the state court. See id. at 144 (citing New Jersey
Court Rule 2:2-3(a)(2)).
198. Id. at 150 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); Fraise, 283 F.3d at
522). The court did not address the question of why disciplinary detention, in
particular, should be anticipated in the absence of a rule violation.
199. Torres, 292 F.3d at 151 (citing. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). The court failed to
offer any rationale for this geographic limitation, and nothing in Sandin imposes such
a limitation, but it is likely based on the Third Circuit's focus and reliance on state
positive law in the form of statutes and regulations governing prison officials.
200. See id. at 151 (citing Fraise, 283 F.3d at 522-23).
201. See id. ("Torres was placed in disciplinary detention for 15 days and
administrative segregation for 120 days in a State where prisoners have no protected
liberty interest in being free of indefinite confinement in the STGMU." (citation
omitted)).
The Seventh Circuit similarly avoided fact development in Leslie v. Doyle, 125
F.3d 1132 (7th Cir. 1997). In Leslie, plaintiff Keith Leslie alleged that a correctional
officer had falsely accused him of misconduct and that he was improperly sentenced
to disciplinary segregation for 15 days. The court provided the following recitation of
facts as viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Leslie, who has a partially
paralyzed leg and must walk with a cane, was handcuffed and shackled in accordance
with regular procedures when returning from a court appearance. "With his hands
and feet bound, he had to hold the cane's handle in the middle of his body while he
kept its other end between his feet." When he reached the first security checkpoint,
defendant "Doyle asked Leslie to look at him and state his name and registration
number." Although Leslie complied, Doyle repeated the order "insisting that Leslie
look directly at him," and when Leslie repeated the information, Doyle let him pass.
As Leslie was walking by, "Doyle grabbed Leslie's cane and shook it." Id. at 1133.
When Leslie reached the area where inmates were searched after passing the
checkpoint, Doyle was already there. Although Leslie cooperated with the officers
doing the search, Doyle accused him of making trouble and sent him to administrative
segregation. Two days later, Leslie received notice of disciplinary charges for
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consider the validity of the purported rationale for imposing the
deprivation and disregarded the different impact that segregative
placements may have on different inmates.2 °2  Instead, the Torres
court broadly concluded that: "Sandin instructs that placement in
administrative confinement will generally not create a liberty
interest. ' 20 3  Without discussing the conditions in disciplinary
detention and administrative segregation at the prison where Torres
had been incarcerated, the court held that he had failed to allege "the
type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might
conceivably create a liberty interest." 21
disobeying a direct order to look at Doyle and for arguing and causing a disturbance
at the checkpoint and search area. An administrative review board reversed the
conviction, but not until after Leslie had already served his 15 days. On appeal, Leslie
included witness statements from the officer accompanying him from court and two
other correctional officers who were present at his encounter with Doyle. The
disciplinary review board expunged his record of these offenses, restored his
classification grade, and compensated him $5.10 for prison wages he had lost while in
segregation. See id. The district court had taken judicial notice of conditions in
disciplinary segregation in Illinois prisons, based on its "extensive experience in
prisoner litigation," and held that confinement for 15 days in such segregation did not
constitute a "significant and atypical hardship." Id. at 1135. The circuit court
affirmed, holding that the harm suffered was not sufficiently grave to give rise to
constitutional protection, although "it [was] wrong for an official of the state to
exercise force against a citizen subject only to his mood or whim, whether that citizen
is free or imprisoned." Id. at 1138; cf Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 483-84 (7th
Cir. 2002) (holding that defendant's use of a waist belt and leg chains in addition to
handcuffs during transport of plaintiff, who had been civilly committed as a sex
offender, was a "small, incremental deprivation[]" that did not implicate a cognizable
liberty interest). The Leslie court editorialized that: "This case raises disturbing
questions about the nature and extent of the constitutional rights that protect state
prisoners from the arbitrary and arguably lawless acts of state prison officials." 125
F.3d at 1132. It nevertheless held that Leslie's claim failed because he had received
adequate procedural due process and his record had been expunged. See id. at 1136.
202. Torres, 292 F.3d at 141. For example, solitary confinement may have a more
severely detrimental effect on an inmate with mental illness.
203. Id. at 151 (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000)).
204. Id. (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). Although to a lesser extent, the Seventh
Circuit has similarly relied on law-based reasoning rather than development of a
factual record. In Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1997), plaintiff Anthony
Thomas was not sentenced to any segregation time for his disciplinary charges, but
remained in segregation for an extra 51 days due to prison administrative errors, for a
total of approximately 70 days. See id. at 756-57. Relying on Williams v. Ramos, 71
F.3d 1246 (7th Cir. 1995), a case challenging segregation in the same institution that
had been decided two years earlier, the Thomas court reasoned that it had
"previously stated that there is no indication that persons in disciplinary segregation
[at Stateville] receive treatment substantially different than that given persons in
discretionary types of segregation."' Id. at 762 (quoting Williams, 71 F.3d at 1249 n.5,
1250). In Williams, the plaintiff alleged that his confinement in segregation for 19
days was significantly more onerous than confinement in general population.
Williams, 71 F.3d at 1249. The court in Williams held that the "catalogue of harms"
described by the plaintiff, 24-hour lock down in his closed front cell; inability to
participate in activities; being handcuffed whenever he left his cell for showers,
medical screening, recreation; and a lack of contact with other inmates or staff did not
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Using case law to analyze due process claims is relatively easier
than developing a factual record on which to base judgments about
typicality. A court can support its conclusion about whether a
plaintiff's claim rises to the level of a liberty interest with legal
research or simply take judicial notice that a claim fails the "atypical
and significant" test.2°5 In theory, a law-based approach should lead to
consistent outcomes. But courts may draw on case law from other
states and circuits, as demonstrated above in Griffin and Fraise, and
there may be intra-circuit splits that work against predictability. As
for integrity, this methodology lacks an objective, neutral principle for
decision making. Although subsequent decisions can rely on stare
decisis, the first decision, as illustrated in Griffin, must make
assumptions or ad hoc decisions about what is "apparent" or
"'uncommon" in reaching a decision about typicality.
3. A Narrow Approach
The circuits that take a narrow approach tend to rely on law-based
reasoning rather than fact-based analysis. Courts within these circuits
appear more willing to draw factual conclusions without any
underlying evidentiary support. Within this category, the Fifth Circuit
stands out as the most extreme proponent of a narrow approach,
concluding that only deprivations affecting the duration of a prisoner's
sentence will impair a state-created liberty interest. While the First,
"greatly exceed[] what one could expect from prison life generally." See id. at 1249 &
n.4.
The Thomas court discussed the description of conditions in Sandin and the
conclusions in Williams, and summarily held that the conditions of Thomas's
confinement did not impose an "atypical and significant hardship." See Thomas, 130
F.3d at 760-62. The court recited Thomas's factual assertions regarding conditions,
including that:
[He was] "confined with another inmate in a cell that he described as
approximately as wide as his outstretched arms and twice that long[,] ... that
he remained locked in this cell 24 hours a day, except those few occasions
when he was allowed to visit the doctor or speak with Ramos [the
superintendent of segregation;] ... [and] that the reason he visited the
doctor was for treatment of mental and physical symptoms caused by the
stress of confinement.
Id. at 757-58. The court nevertheless relied on case law holding that segregation
conditions in this particular facility were not "atypical and significant." See id. at 760-
62. With respect to the differing lengths of segregation in Sandin (30 days) and
Williams (19 days), and Thomas' approximately 70-day confinement in segregation,
the court declared that 70 days "was obviously a relatively short period when one
considers his 12 year prison sentence," and that the first 15 days of segregation
constituted temporary confinement and investigative status which, unlike disciplinary
segregation, do not implicate a liberty interest. See id. at 761. Furthermore, Thomas's
extended confinement in disciplinary segregation "did not result in an atypical and
significant deprivation because the conditions he experienced did not 'greatly exceed
what one could expect from prison life generally."' Id. at 762 (quoting Williams, 71
F.3d at 1249).
205. The use of judicial notice in this context is discussed further in note 246 infra.
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Sixth, and Eighth Circuits appear to be moving in this same direction,
the Fourth Circuit seems to be in the process of constructing an
exhaustion of state remedies requirement as a filter for federal due
process claims. This section discusses two decisions from the Fifth
Circuit that, on their face, relate to length of incarceration, and one
from the Fourth Circuit that involved an actual deprivation of liberty
through the use of a restraint chair as examples.
In Orellana v. Kyle,2" 6 plaintiff Samuel Orellana challenged parole
review procedures, alleging that "prisoners are not given advance
written notice of hearings, not afforded an opportunity to be heard,
denied access to all materials considered by the board, and denied the
right to be accompanied by persons of their choice. '20 7 The court
recognized that good-time credits and release on parole implicate
constitutionally protected liberty interests,2 °8 but found it hard to
conceive of "any other deprivations in the prison context, short of
those that clearly impinge on the duration of confinement" that would
"qualify for constitutional liberty status." 109 Although Orellana's due
206. 65 F.3d 29 (5th Cir. 1995).
207. Id. at 31.
208. See id. (citing Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
209. Id. at 31-32. The First Circuit's decision in Dominique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 1156
(1st Cir. 1996), similarly focused on duration of confinement. In Dominique, plaintiff
James Dominique challenged his removal from a work release program after almost
four years of successful participation, and transfer from a minimum to a medium
security prison. See id. at 1156-57. Dominique had been transferred to a minimum
security institution in 1987, permitted to renew his driver's license in connection with
his work on state vehicles in 1988, and approved for the Community Work Release
Program in 1990. See id. at 1157. He became a mechanic for a private company and
the following year opened his own vehicle repair business. See id. Dominique alleged
that "his removal resulted from media and public uproar following an incident-
wholly unrelated to him," and that he "was never given a written statement of reasons
for his removal." Id. Defendants asserted that Dominique's denial of responsibility
for his crimes, the lack of accountability in his particular work release program, and
his increased escape risk following three denials of parole were the cause. See id. at
1157.
The court rejected Dominique's contention that state regulations and the
Community Release Agreement gave rise to a state-created liberty interest, reasoning
that his sentence was not lengthened. See Hamm v. Latessa, 72 F.3d 947, 956 (1st Cir.
1995) (holding that a change in state law that delayed plaintiff's parole hearing date
did not give rise to a protected liberty interest); ef. MeGuinness v. Dubois, 75 F.3d
794, 795-98 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (assuming that the loss of 100 days of good-
time credit gave rise to a liberty interest requiring some measure of procedural due
process). The court additionally concluded that "his transfer to a more secure facility
subjected him to conditions no different from those ordinarily experienced by large
numbers of other inmates serving their sentences in customary fashion." Dominique,
73 F.3d at 1160. Thus the court did not use Dominique's individual experience as a
basis for measuring atypicality, but rather the common practice applied to prisoners
as a whole. See id. It took particular note of the fact that "an inmate's subjective
expectations are not dispositive of the liberty-interest analysis." Id. (citing Sandin, 515
U.S. at 486 n.9); see also Asquith v. Dep't. of Corr., 186 F.3d 407, 412 (3d Cir. 1999)
("Sandin does not permit us to compare the prisoner's own life before and after the
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process claim related to parole, the court relied on previously decided
cases holding that the Texas parole statutes at issue did not to give rise
to a liberty interest.210 Without explaining its rationale, the court also
asserted that "[i]t is unlikely ... administrative segregation can give
rise to any constitutional claim after Sandin.'21  The Fifth Circuit
alleged deprivation. Rather, we must compare the prisoner's liberties after the
alleged deprivation with the normal incidents of prison life." (citation omitted)). But
cf. McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a prisoner
who "was only six months shy of a release [on parole] that he had been affirmatively
promised a decade and a half earlier had a constitutionally protected interest in
freedom from confinement").
Similarly, in Callender v. Sioux City Residential Treatment Facility, 88 F.3d 666
(8th Cir. 1996), plaintiff James Callender challenged the defendant's revocation of his
participation in a work release program. See id. at 667. The parole board approved
him for work release, but Callender refused to admit guilt and take responsibility
under the sex offender and work release program, and his work release was revoked.
See id. The Eighth Circuit had previously found a liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause itself "when a person has substantial, albeit conditional, freedom such
as when he is on probation or parole." Id. at 668 (citing Edwards v. Lockhart, 908
F.2d 299, 301 (8th Cir. 1990)); see also Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1997)
(holding that the pre-parole program at issue was sufficiently similar to parole or
probation such that continued participation was protected by the Due Process
Clause). But the court ruled that Callender's "work release program did not provide
the sort of substantial freedom that gives rise to a liberty interest inherent in the Due
Process Clause." Callender, 88 F.3d at 668. Callender was transferred out of the
residential center two days after he had arrived, and he therefore had not earned any
furlough privileges. See id. The court further held that Callender had no state-created
liberty interest in remaining in a work release program. See id. at 669-70. One
significant factor appeared to be that "there is no indication in the record that the
duration of Mr. Callender's sentence was in any way affected by the revocation of his
work release status." Id. at 669.
The court did not compare the conditions in the work release program with
any "baseline" of incarceration; instead, it essentially assumed that the revocation of
this program was not atypical and significant because "[c]learly, many inmates
endured the same conditions of confinement that Mr. Callender did when he was
transferred back" to the same institution he had left two or three months earlier upon
being granted work release. Id. The court recognized that upon his return, Callender
"lost all the privileges he had earned and had to start over within the institutional
system"; however, it deemed that deprivation as "not atypical of what inmates have to
endure in daily prison life." Id.
210. See Orellana, 65 F.3d at 32 (citing Creel v. Keene, 928 F.2d 707, 712 (5th Cir.
1991); Gilbertson v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 993 F.2d 74, 75 (5th Cir. 1993));
see also Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that "Texas
prisoners have no protected liberty interest in parole" and therefore cannot state a
due process claim based on the parole board's procedures). But cf McQuillion, 306
F.3d at 903 (limiting the reach of Sandin's liberty interest analysis to internal prison
disciplinary regulations in the context of plaintiff's challenge to rescission of his
parole date).
211. Orellana, 65 F.3d at 32 n.2. The court did not address the question of
typicality, apparently assuming that placement in administrative segregation,
regardless of the frequency of, length of, conditions of, or reason for such placement
is by definition typical.
In Moorman v. Thalacker, 83 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 1996), the Eighth Circuit
similarly concluded that the plaintiff's disciplinary detention for 122 days did not
cause "a disruption exceeding the ordinary incidents of prison life" and thus did not
give rise to a liberty interest. See id. at 973 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215
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subsequently held that "absent extraordinary circumstances,
administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary
life as a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim. 2 12
(1976)); see also Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1337 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that
although transfer to a higher-security prison resulted in a diminution in privileges,
"there is no liberty interest in assignment to any particular prison"); cf. Portley-El v.
Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Given the likelihood that neither thirty
days in punitive segregation in Minnesota nor [plaintiff's] initial reclassification to a
maximum security classification in Colorado was in fact an atypical and significant
hardship, the district court did not err in dismissing those claims .... ); Kennedy v.
Blakenship, 100 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that prisoner plaintiff's
transfer from administrative segregation to punitive isolation did not implicate a
protected liberty interest); Wycoff v. Nichols, 94 F.3d 1187, 1190 (8th Cir. 1996)
("[Plaintiff] has no liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation unless the
conditions of his confinement present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in
which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest." (internal quotations
omitted)).
The Sixth Circuit, in Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1998), also
emphasized the importance of the effect on length of incarceration. Plaintiff Alvin
Jones challenged his confinement in administrative segregation for approximately two
and one-half years. See id. at 812. In 1993, after a prison riot during which nine
inmates and one corrections officer were killed, Jones and 128 other inmates were
transferred to a different prison and placed in nondisciplinary segregation, called
Security Control, while the riot was investigated. Apart from a stay in Administrative
Control, from June 1993 until the end of 1993, Jones remained in Security Control
until January 1996 when he participated in a two-day disciplinary hearing and was
found guilty, along with another prisoner, of killing the officer and was placed in
Administrative Control, which is more restrictive than Security Control. Jones did
not challenge his placement in Administrative Control following the January 1996
hearing. See id. at 811-12.
The court relied in part on case law to support its assertion that administrative
segregation does not constitute an "atypical and significant" hardship. Id. at 812
(citing Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62
F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995)). In Mackey, the court deferred to the judgment of
prison officials that confinement in administrative segregation for 117 extra days
because of overcrowding and the lack of bed space in the general population was not
"atypical and significant." See 111 F.3d at 463. In Rimmer-Bey, the court held that
"[tihe plaintiff's placement in administrative segregation was not an atypical and
significant hardship, as intended by Sandin, within the context of his life sentence." 62
F.3d at 791. It also relied on the fact that applicable state law permitted
administrative segregation to "continue for an indefinite time period."' Jones, 155
F.3d at 812 (quoting Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-13(A)). But see id. at 816 (Gilman,
J., concurring) ("[P]roper analysis should focus not on whether the prison was
authorized to place Jones in administrative segregation for any particular length of
time, but rather on determining the point at which the prison had to comply with the
procedural safeguards provided by the Due Process Clause in order to keep him
there."). Finally, the court noted that "a liberty interest determination is to be made
based on whether it will affect the overall duration of the inmate's sentence and there
is no evidence here that the segregation will impact plaintiff's sentence." Id. at 812.
Without citing to any evidence, the court summarily asserted that "the conditions of
plaintiff's confinement... in administrative segregation and security control were not
much different than that experienced by other inmates in segregation." Id. at 813.
212. Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Penrod v.
Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1407 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that "administrative segregation
is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some
point in their incarceration" and holding that an 11-month stay in administrative
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Even where good-time credits were at issue, the Fifth Circuit
narrowly construed the range of protected interests under Sandin. In
Malchi v. Thaler,1 3 the circuit court reversed the lower court's
decision "that the disciplinary decision was arbitrary and capricious
and that the hearing did not meet the requirements of minimal due
process. ' 214  The court recognized that "Texas's mandatory
supervision scheme... for earned good time credits" gave rise to a
state-created liberty interest.215 It further held that the delay of more
than six months in the plaintiff's release date due to the disciplinary
action and resultant change of good-time-earning status was more
than de minimis.21 6 The court nevertheless distinguished between the
forfeiture of "previously earned good-time credits" and the reduction
in "good-time-earning status., 217 It held that "the timing of Malchi's
release [was] too speculative to afford him a constitutionally
cognizable claim to the 'right' to a particular time-earning status. '218
segregation resulting from legitimate security concerns was not atypical and
significant (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983))); cf Bulger v. U.S.
Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that "a prisoner does not
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to continuing UNICOR [Federal Prison
Industries] employment" notwithstanding a diminution in the ability to accrue good-
time credits).
213. 211 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 2000).
214. Id. at 956. The district court had found that plaintiff Dobber Malchi did not
possess the contraband he was found guilty of possessing, specifically, "that there
were no facts that would support the finding that Malchi was found in possession of a
box of stolen envelopes." Id.
215. Id. at 957-58. Unlike parole which is "discretionary and conditional release,"
mandatory supervision is the "release of an eligible prisoner.., so that the prisoner
may serve the remainder of his sentence not on parole, but under the supervision and
control of the pardons and paroles division." Id. at 957 (quoting Madison v. Parker,
104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997)); cf. Moorman, 83 F.3d at 973 (citing Iowa Code
Ann. §§ 903A.2, 903A.3 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
545 & n.5, 546 & n.6, 597 (1974) (minimizing the loss of good-time credits and
distinguishing the relevant state statutes from the "mandatory" statute at issue in
Wolff which required "flagrant or serious misconduct" before good time could be
revoked)); Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying the
opportunity to earn good-time credits did not inevitably affect the duration of
sentence, since an inmate may not succeed in actually earning credits, and it thus "did
not infringe on a protected liberty interest").
216. See Malachi, 211 F.3d at 958.
217. Id. Before the disciplinary hearing, the plaintiff had been a state-approved
trustee-3, status S-3; once he had been found guilty, he became a line one, status L-1.
See id. at 955. As an L-1, he earned less credit towards release for each day of good
conduct than he had previously earned as an S-3. See id. at 958.
218. Id. at 959; see also Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[L]oss of
the opportunity to earn good-time credits, which might lead to earlier parole," based
on placement in administrative segregation is a "speculative, collateral
consequence[]" that does not create a "constitutionally protected liberty interest[].").
The Malchi court noted that the plaintiff
may, without reference to this or any other disciplinary action, fail to earn
the full measure of good-time credit available at S-3 status .... Assignment
to a particular time-earning status depends on a wide variety of factors,
including how long an inmate has been in the Texas prison system, his
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The Fourth Circuit has not articulated a general rule that is as
narrow as the Fifth Circuit's rule requiring an impact on the duration
of imprisonment; however, it appears to have constructed an
exhaustion requirement, mandating that plaintiffs avail themselves of
potential state court remedies before pursuing a Due Process claim in
federal court. In Williams v. Benjamin,219 plaintiff Sylvester Williams
asserted that he had been sprayed with mace, not permitted to wash it
off, and then placed in four-point restraints220 to a bare metal bed
frame for more than eight hours without receiving any medical care or
being allowed to use a toilet.221  The court held that: "[t]otal
immobilization in the restraints surely 'work[ed] a major disruption in
his environment.' ' 22  It reasoned that the relevant state regulation,
Policy 1500.12, was written in mandatory language and required the
presence of "enumerated substantive predicates" before mechanical
restraints were used, and that the "limitations and protections" in the
law evidenced the atypicality and significance of using restraints.223
disciplinary record, his participation in education and work activities and the
Texas good-conduct laws in effect on his offense date.
211 F.3d at 958-59 (citing Texas Dept. Crim. Justice Offender Orientation Handbook,
II.D. Good Conduct Time (August 1997)); cf. Thompson v. Cockrell, 263 F.3d 423,
427-28 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that deprivation of good-time credits for the calendar
time that had elapsed since his erroneously premature release gave rise to a liberty
interest since it would inevitably affect the duration of his confinement); Franklin v.
District of Columbia, 168 F.3d 1360, 1361-62 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Wald, J., & Tatel, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that the loss of good-time
credits through disciplinary hearings would give rise to a liberty interest worthy of due
process protections).
219. 77 F.3d 756 (4th Cir. 1996).
220. The four-point restraints "involved securing Williams to the metal bed frame
with handcuffs attached to his wrists and leg shackles attached to his ankles, so that
[he] was immobilized." Id. at 760. Thus, he was chained "to a metal bed frame in a
spread-eagled position." Id. at 763; cf Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 339-340 (3d
Cir. 2000) (describing use of restraint chair which had a back that was angled at 45
degrees and in which an inmate has his arms handcuffed behind his back, his legs
shackled, and restraint belts placed across his chest, lap, and ankles, where the inmate
was restrained for eight hours, but released every two hours for a ten minute period
of stretching, exercise, and use of the toilet).
221. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 760. After Williams and six other inmates had thrown
water out of their cells to protest a correctional officer's threat to use mace, all seven
inmates were maced and immediately stopped their protest. See id. at 759. The
defendants maintained that the inmates had thrown "cups of unidentified foul-
smelling liquids" and that pursuant to South Carolina Department of Corrections
written policy, the prison medical director authorized use of the four-point restraints,
a nurse checked whether the restraints had been applied properly, and a corrections
officer monitored Williams every 15 minutes. See id. at 760; see also id. at 764 n.4
(citing Program Statement, CPD 5566.04, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of
Prisons § 10(d) (June 13, 1994) ("The eyes are to be flushed with cold water within
five minutes of exposure, to ensure appropriate decontamination.")).
222. Id. at 769 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995)).
223. See id. Policy 1500.12 essentially requires that mechanical restraints only be
used to prevent self-injury or injury to others, not as punishment or to enhance facility
security, and that they not be used longer than necessary. See id. at 766. Policy
1500.12 incorporated portions of a federal consent decree. See id. at 768 (citing Plyler
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Nevertheless, the court faulted Williams for failing to allege that his
post-deprivation state remedies were inadequate, and failing to set
forth the procedural protections that should have been provided.224
Without delving into what post-deprivation state remedies were in
fact available, the court asserted that where "full pre-deprivation
procedural protections" are not possible "because of an emergency
situation, there is particular reason for a federal court to conclude that
post-deprivation state remedies adequately protect state-created
liberty interests. '25  Accordingly, the court affirmed summary
judgment for the defendants on Williams' due process claim.226
Compared to a law-based approach, the narrow approach taken by
the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits is even easier to apply and
will likely lead to more consistent results. This methodology is
equivalent to having a bright-line rule against finding a state-created
liberty interest except in those rare circumstances where it appears
certain that a prisoner's period of incarceration was lengthened as a
result of the challenged action. The strengths in ease of application
and consistency are counterbalanced, however, by a low integrity
score. These circuits have not articulated a clear justification for their
decision essentially to exempt all administrative segregation
placements from due process scrutiny. With respect to the Fourth
Circuit, having an exhaustion requirement will make those cases in
which a prisoner has failed to exhaust easy to decide, and perhaps as a
practical matter would resolve the majority of cases. But, if prisoners
are able to exhaust their state remedies, then this approach provides
v. Leeke, No. 82-876-2, 1986 WL 84459 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 1986) (resolving an inmate
class action suit)). The court also rejected the defendants' reliance on three reported
cases from other circuits, finding that in each of those cases, there was an extensive
factual record justifying the prolonged use of four-point restraints, and indicating
compliance with correctional regulations. See id. at 767 (citing LeMaire v. Maass, 12
F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993); Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991); Bruscino
v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1988)).
224. See id. at 769-70 (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126-30 (1990)). It
also asserted that since "the restraints were imposed in response to a disturbance ...
process [was] not possible." Id. at 769. The court hedged this conclusion, however,
recognizing that four-point restraints could not be imposed indefinitely without any
procedural due process protections, but other than implicitly holding that more than
eight hours passed constitutional muster, it declined to resolve at what point, "an
inmate so restrained would be entitled to some procedural protection to ensure that
his liberty interest was not being arbitrarily and capriciously denied." Id. at 769 n.10.
225. Id. at 770 (citing Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128 (addressing sufficiency of post-
deprivation process where pre-deprivation process is impracticable)).
226. See id. For a similar ruling, see Davis v. Lester, 156 F. Supp. 2d 588, 596 (W.D.
Va. 2001) (citing failure to show inadequacy of post-deprivation remedies). With
respect to William's Eighth Amendment claim, the court reversed the grant of
summary judgment because "[tihe record at present contains no reason for the
guards' refusal to permit Williams to wash, no evidence that [he] was not in the
'immense pain' he alleges, and no justification for the extended period of time [he]
was left in the restraints." 77 F.3d at 765. The court held that William's substantive
due process claim added nothing to his Eighth Amendment claim. See id. at 768.
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no guidance or benefit in terms of easy application, predictability, or
integrity.
4. A Broad Approach
The circuits that take a broad approach tend to find liberty interests
in more wide-ranging factual scenarios without adhering to any
particular methodology for analyzing typicality, significance, or state
positive law. Unlike the narrow approach which overlapped with law-
based reasoning, courts that use the broad approach do not
consistently rely on case law or require the development of empirical
evidence. With the Fifth Circuit on one end of the spectrum, the
Ninth Circuit occupies the other end, holding that the right to due
process protects interests ranging from classification as a sex offender
to fair dealing in the prison disciplinary process-even in the absence
of an atypical and significant deprivation. A discussion of two Ninth
Circuit cases, Neal v. Shimoda227 and Burnsworth v. Gunderson,228
illustrates this approach.
In Neal, prisoner plaintiff J. Neal challenged his classification as a
sex offender and the requirement that he participate in the state's Sex
Offender Treatment Program ("SOTP") to become eligible for
parole.229 The SOTP statute defined a sex offender as someone
"having been convicted, at any time, of any sex offense or [who]
engaged in sexual misconduct during the course of an offense," but
Neal had pled guilty pursuant to an agreement in which the sex
offense charges for which he was indicted were dismissed.230 Relying
on the Supreme Court's decision in Vitek v. Jones,23 ' the Neal court
reasoned that the "stigmatizing consequences" of being labeled a sex
offender were analogous to those of being labeled mentally ill.232 The
227. 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997).
228. 179 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 1999).
229. See 131 F.3d at 822. SOTP required participation in a twenty-five session
psycho-educational treatment program and confession to past sex offenses as a
precondition to parole eligibility. See id. at 822, 829.
230. Id. at 822.
231. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
232. See 131 F.3d at 829. The court noted that although there currently was an
increased medical and scientific understanding of mental illness, "when Vitek was
decided in 1980, the causes of mental illness were still largely shrouded in mystery,
adding to the stigma associated with mental diseases." Id.
In Perkins v. Kansas Department of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 1999),
the Tenth Circuit similarly confronted a fact scenario that raised concerns about
stigmatization and singling out an individual prisoner for arbitrary treatment.
Plaintiff Darren Perkins challenged the requirement that he wear a face mask
whenever he left his cell, the denial of all outdoor exercise for over nine months, and
the denial of medical treatment for his HIV-positive status. Perkins had spat at two
prison guards over a year earlier, and from that time until the trial, he was "required
to wear a face mask that covers his entire head whenever he leaves his cell and he
[was] denied all exercise outside his cell." Id. at 806 & n.4. Since he found the face
mask demeaning and emotionally and psychologically distressful, Perkins chose not to
20041 829
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court held that: "[t]he classification of an inmate as a sex offender is
precisely the type of 'atypical and significant hardship on the inmate
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life' that the Supreme
Court held created a protected liberty interest. '233 Thus, Neal, who
leave his cell for extended periods of time, even for showers and medical
appointments. See Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806. Perkins alleged that he was being
punished because he was HIV-positive and that other prisoners had spat on guards
and not been similarly punished. See id. He further alleged that the face mask
restriction does not prevent him from spitting on inmates or guards because he could
do so every time he takes a shower; that since the one incident, he has not spat on
anyone; and that the face mask is simply meant to brand him as being HIV-positive
and humiliate him. See id. at 811. The court described Perkins's conditions of
confinement as alleged in his complaint as follows:
[H]e is confined in an eight-foot by fourteen-foot concrete cell for twenty-
three and one-half hours a day. He is permitted to leave his cell for thirty
minutes each day, to take a shower, but he must wear the face mask when he
is out of his cell. Plaintiff has not been permitted exercise outside his cell for
over a year.
Id. at 809. The court flatly rejected the defendants' claim that such conditions do not
pose an atypical and significant hardship because prisoners are ordinarily locked
down in segregation for a variety of offenses. It stated that this assertion did "not
fully address both the duration and degree of plaintiff's restrictions as compared with
other inmates." Id.; see also Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002)
(reversing dismissal of plaintiff's due process challenge to his 75-day confinement in
disciplinary segregation where there was "a complete absence of evidence concerning
whether the duration and conditions of the prisoner's confinement in disciplinary
segregation is atypical and significant in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life"). The court remanded Perkins's due process claim and the portion of his Eighth
Amendment claim based on the face mask and exercise restriction, but affirmed the
dismissal of his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
claim as a disagreement about his course of treatment. See id. at 810-11.
233. Neal, 131 F.3d at 829 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)).
The Neal court rejected the state's argument that the SOTP treatment program was
voluntary, reasoning that an inmate was rendered "completely ineligible for parole if
the treatment program [was] not satisfactorily completed." Id. But cf. Reed v.
McKune, 298 F.3d 946, 954 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff's claim of parole
denial based solely on failure to participate in a sexual abuse treatment program
failed in light of the parole board's explicitly stated reason for denial, the "serious
nature and circumstances of [his] crime").
The Eleventh Circuit analyzed another state's sex offender classification
scheme in a similarly broad, but different way. In Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285
(11th Cir. 1999), plaintiff Robert Edmond challenged his classification as a sex
offender. Although he had never been convicted of a sex offense, he was classified
based on charges of rape and sexual abuse that were listed in his pre-sentence report.
See id. at 1288. The defendant further relied on information it had received from a
local district attorney's office regarding allegations of sexual abuse and kidnapping.
See id. As a consequence of his sex offender status, Kirby was required to participate
in group therapy "as a prerequisite for parole eligibility" and to admit to past sexual
offenses; was made ineligible for minimum custody and the work-release and
community custody programs; and was allegedly subjected to the stigma that follows
from sex offender status. See id.
The Eleventh Circuit held that although the state had not created a liberty
interest, see id. at 1291 (holding that applicable regulations provided that "inmates
with two or more arrests of record for sex crimes for which the disposition is unknown
or given as dismissed, no billed, nolle prossed, etc., will be construed as sex offenders
for the purpose of classification"), the Fourteenth Amendment itself gave rise to a
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had never been convicted of a sex offense, was "entitled to the
procedural protections outlined by the Supreme Court in Wolff. 234
In contrast, Burnsworth did not involve an atypical or significant
deprivation.235 In Burnsworth, the district court had ordered the
defendants to expunge plaintiff Harry Burnsworth's unsubstantiated
escape conviction, and the defendants appealed. 236  The appellate
court held that "even if plaintiff has demonstrated no cognizable
liberty interest, ' 237 a prison disciplinary hearing board violates due
"liberty interest in not being branded a sex offender.. . [because such] a change in
the prisoner's conditions of confinement is so severe that it essentially exceeds the
sentence imposed by the court." Id. The Kirby court relied on the Supreme Court's
conclusion that "prisoners had a liberty interest in not being transferred to a mental
hospital independent of state law ... [that] encompassed both the labeling of the
inmate as mentally ill as well as the transfer to the mental hospital." Id. at 1292 (citing
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487-88, 491 (1980)). Just as the Supreme Court had
recognized the stigma associated with mental illness, see Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492, the
Eleventh Circuit recognized that "the stigmatizing effect of being classified as a sex
offender constitutes a deprivation of liberty under the Due Process Clause." Kirby,
195 F.3d at 1292 (citing Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818,829 (9th Cir. 1997)). The court
explained that: "[an inmate who has never been convicted of a sex crime is entitled
to due process before the state declares him to be a sex offender." Id. The court
remanded because it could not determine whether Kirby had "received adequate
notice and hearing to satisfy due process requirements" based on the factual record
below. Id. at 1287, 1292.
234. Neal, 131 F.3d at 831; see also supra text accompanying notes 28-49 (discussing
Wolff). With respect to what process is due, the Neal court held that "an inmate
whom the prison intends to classify as a sex offender is entitled to a hearing at which
he must be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his
defense," as well as "an advance statement of the reasons for that classification." Id.
at 831 & n.14. The court contrasted the absence of any process provided to Neal with
the "probable cause hearing, mental health evaluation, and full trial" required before
an inmate could be labeled a sexually violent predator under another state's statute.
See id. at 831 n.15 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353 (1997)).
235. Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 1999).
236. Id. at 773. Burnsworth's conviction was based on a conversation he had had
with a corrections officer during which he asked for protective custody because he
was having problems with some other inmates, and stated that if he did not receive it,
his only option would be to "hit the fence." See id. at 772. When asked what he
meant, he said that he would be forced to "hop the fence and run all the way to
Tucson." Id.
237. Id. at 775. Plaintiff's escape conviction resulted in "40 hours extra duty and 30
days in Parole Class III," as well as a transfer to a maximum security facility. See id. at
772.
In Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999), the Eleventh Circuit was
similarly confronted with an alleged deprivation, two hours of weekly outdoor
exercise, that it could have found to fail the "atypical and significant" test. In Bass,
the plaintiffs, who were housed in a form of solitary confinement known as "Close
Management," were deprived of the two hours per week of outdoor exercise time that
were ordinarily allotted in this housing. See id. at 1315. Plaintiff Frankie Bass was
denied outdoor exercise time by virtue of his placement on the Yard Suspension List
("YSL") in October 1989 for possession of homemade weapons and other items; his
time on the YSL was extended in May 1991 until May 1992, when he stabbed another
inmate. See id. Plaintiff Leonard Bean was placed on the YSL from May 1983 until
November 1991 for murdering a correctional officer and then returned to the list from
April 1992 until November 1992 for possession of a homemade handcuff key. See id.
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process when it "convicts an inmate of escape after that board holds a
hearing at which no shred of evidence of the inmate's guilt is
presented., 23 It parsed the three post-Sandin opinions in Ohio Adult
In April 1993, Bass and Bean attempted to escape, scaling a fence, commandeering a
dump truck, and driving through the perimeter fence before they were captured.
They were again placed on the YSL, at least up until they filed suit in June 1993. See
id.
In analyzing their due process claim, the court held that the plaintiffs had
asserted a cognizable state-created liberty interest within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 1318. The pertinent Administrative Code
provision mandated that prisoners in Close Management receive two hours per week
of yard time absent clear and compelling reasons to the contrary. Id. (citing Fla.
Admin. Code Ann. r. 33-3.0083(9)(i)); see also Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1424
(11th Cir. 1987) (finding the creation of liberty interests through the state
administrative code). The court in Bass held that withholding this time met the
Sandin "atypical and significant" hardship standard. See 170 F.3d at 1316 n.4, 1318
(noting example of 17th century succession to the Turkish throne in which heirs to the
throne were kept in continual confinement to prevent assassination and went insane
(citing Noel Barber, The Sultans 78-80 (1973))).
The court reasoned that the marginal difference between receiving and not
receiving the two hours of outdoor time was substantial, and then essentially assumed
that the deprivation was atypical without engaging in any empirical analysis of the
frequency with which prisoners were placed on the YSL. See id. at 1318. Although
the court below had denied the plaintiffs' request for appointment of an expert
witness, Dr. Michael L. Pollock, Professor of Medicine and Director of the Center for
Exercise Science at the University of Florida, who "presumably would have testified
as to the potentially harmful effects of the total deprivation of outdoor exercise," id.
at 1319-20, the Eleventh Circuit noted that such evidence might have supported the
claim that placement on the YSL imposed an "atypical and significant" hardship. See
id. at 1320.
Ultimately, however, the court held that the process provided to the plaintiffs
had been sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The court
asserted that in the context of disciplinary action, due process required "(1) advance
written notice of the charges; (2) a written statement of the reasons for the
disciplinary action taken; and (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present
evidence, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals." Id. at 1318
(citing Young v. Jones, 37 F.3d 1457, 1459-60 (11th Cir. 1994)); see also Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974) (same). Although the plaintiffs did not
receive advance written notice of the charges before being placed on the YSL, the
court held that this failure was cured by granting them a full appeal process. See Bass,
170 F.3d at 1319. With respect to the third requirement, the court was satisfied that
the plaintiffs' past history of posing a threat to institutional safety justified denial of
this opportunity, without requiring a showing that the specific instance would pose
such a threat. See id. The court moreover asserted that "under the circumstances, the
plaintiffs had no need to present evidence because the facts underlying the
defendants' decision-the instances of misbehavior by the plaintiffs-were not in
dispute." Id.
238. Burnsworth, 179 F.3d at 774; see also id. at 774-75 (citing California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 186 n.20 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Due process does not permit a
conviction based on no evidence."); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206
(1960) ("It is "a violation of due process to convict and punish a man without
evidence of his guilt.")); cf. Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 451, 457 (9th Cir. 1996)
(remanding for further fact-finding where defendants had failed to provide a deaf
plaintiff with a certified interpreter at a disciplinary hearing resulting in a 15-day
sentence). But see Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
plaintiff's sufficiency of the evidence challenge to disciplinary segregation placement
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Parole Authority v. Woodard,239 and relied in part on the fact that
although clemency decisions are discretionary and do not give rise to a
liberty interest, "a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court
nonetheless believe that 'some minimal procedural safeguards apply
to clemency proceedings. "'240 The Burnsworth court also analogized
to the right to appeal a criminal conviction and the right to parole or
probation under certain conditions. Although the state is not required
to afford these rights, it must use procedures that satisfy the Due
Process Clause once they have been provided.24 1 The court affirmed
the expungement remedy, opining that "[a] contrary conclusion
ignores the core of our concept of procedural due process...
'protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government.""'24
The broad approach provides little by way of specific guidance on
for 14 days because, "[b]ased on the Supreme Court's holding in Sandin .... there
[was] no liberty interest at issue").
239. 523 U.S. 272 (1998); see also supra text accompanying notes 147-51 (discussing
Woodard).
240. Burnsworth, 179 F.3d at 775 (quoting Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); and citing id. at 291 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
joined Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor posited the
following hypothetical: "Judicial intervention might, for example, be warranted in the
face of a scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant
clemency, or in a case where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its
clemency process." Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens expressed his disagreement with the
reasoning that "a clemency proceeding could never violate the Due Process Clause,"
stating that "even procedures infected by bribery, personal or political animosity, or
the deliberate fabrication of false evidence would be constitutionally acceptable"
under that reasoning. Id. at 290-91 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). One potential distinction that the Burnsworth court did not address, however,
is the fact that clemency is clearly a matter of great significance, whereas extra duty, a
change in classification, or a transfer could be considered de minimis.
241. Burnsworth, 179 F.3d at 775 (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985)
(criminal appeal); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-90 (1972) (parole); Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973) (probation)). But see Franklin v. District of
Columbia, 163 F.3d 625, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[Ulnless an individual is threatened
with losing 'liberty' within the Fifth Amendment's meaning, it is of no constitutional
moment whether the individual will receive 'due process of law."'). In Franklin, the
plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of Spanish-speaking prisoners seeking
qualified interpreters for parole and disciplinary hearings and in accessing medical
care. See 163 F.3d at 628. The circuit court rejected the district court's reasoning that
once the District of Columbia granted a hearing, that hearing must satisfy a basic
fairness standard. See id. at 631-32. The circuit court analyzed Fifth rather than
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests since the District of Columbia is not a state.
See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); District of Columbia v. Thompson
Co., 346 U.S. 100, 104, 105 (1953).
242. 179 F.3d at 775 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)). But
see Strong v. Ford, No. 95-16404, 1997 WL 120757, *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 1997)
(holding that even if a defendant prison guard had manufactured evidence against
plaintiff, that guard's actions did not infringe on a protected liberty interest because
the result, a loss of 30 credit days was not an "atypical hardship").
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how to analyze prisoners' due process claims, but it is consequently
easy to apply since there is no methodology or procedure that must be
followed. It assumes a wide definition of state-created liberty
interests, and courts taking this approach can freely use law-based
reasoning or fact-based analysis to support their conclusions. As
compared to the three previous categories, circuits within this group
provide the lowest level of consistency and highest level of
unpredictability. Burnsworth is the paradigmatic example of this.
Although the deprivation (extra duty, a temporary classification
change, and a transfer) is arguably typical and of limited significance,
the court nevertheless found a liberty interest. One example of
inconsistent results is the disparity between the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Neal, finding a liberty interest in sex offender classification
without careful review of state positive law and by essentially
assuming that the "atypical and significant" test had been met, and the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Kirby, finding that state regulations
precluded the formation of a state-created liberty interest. Finally,
the broad approach is the most incoherent of the four methodologies
surveyed. Although one might approve of the outcomes, which are
generally protective of prisoners' due process rights, there is no
principled analytical framework for deciding cases.
IV. A POST-SANDIN METHODOLOGY
The following proposal is premised on the fact that the Sandin test
has become embedded in prisoners' due process jurisprudence. It
accepts typicality and significance as governing legal principles and
seeks to explain how best to apply them to the difficult question of
whether a due process claim implicates a state-created liberty
interest.243 Although my proposal ultimately envisions a national
standard for measuring due process violations, it incorporates an
evaluation of statewide practices and state positive law in the short
term.
Based in part on its perception of prisoners combing through
regulations in search of a viable claim, the Sandin Court sought to
construct an additional filter that could assist courts in screening out
non-meritorious cases. The Court has been only partially successful,
243. It is worthwhile to consider, however, what the effect of this standard may be
over time. Does it make sense to validate what is done in the usual course and
impose a requirement of procedural regularity for unusual or atypical occurrences?
Part of the answer to this question depends on whether one is satisfied with the status
quo. For example, a prisoner raising a due process challenge to an allegedly corrupt
disciplinary hearing process may be stymied, if it turns out that the system throughout
the state is administered poorly and is susceptible to accusations of corruption. In one
sense, there is a possible incentive to behave poorly on a regular basis, so that one
more instance of poor behavior will not be deemed atypical. Alternatively, a
typicality standard creates a perverse incentive to behave randomly so that there is no
uniform baseline against which to measure challenged conduct.
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however, in paving the way for a quick and easy resolution of
prisoners' due process claims. 2" Although courts that take a narrow
approach and find no liberty interest absent a lengthened term of
incarceration have adopted a relatively easy decisional rule, courts
within the other three categories have struggled with the concepts of
typicality and significance. Sandin also engendered confusion by
failing to specify what role, if any, state positive law should play in
liberty interest analysis. My proposal seeks to craft a method for
analyzing prisoners' due process claims that is in keeping with
traditional interpretations of due process rights and jurisprudence,
and that will lead to rational results and the sensible development of
the law. The following sections explain how my balancing test would
work, and then evaluate it for ease of application, consistency of
outcomes, and integrity.
A. Explanation
I propose that judgments about typicality be grounded in empirical
evidence of actual state practices, that significance be initially applied
as a de minimis threshold test, and that state positive law continue to
inform liberty interest analysis. These factors should be balanced and
weighed against each other so that, for example, an unusually atypical
deprivation could create a liberty interest even if state law did not
contain the traditional Hewitt elements of mandatory language,
substantive predicates, and cabined discretion. Conversely, a typical
practice in a state where state law explicitly requires a specific finding
before that practice can occur, and limits discretion to waive that
finding could also give rise to a liberty interest. A due process claim
that was weak with respect to one factor could compensate for that
weakness through strength in another factor. As a de minimis
threshold, significance could eliminate the need to evaluate typicality
or examine state law when the interest asserted clearly falls below
what may warrant procedural due process protection. Once this
threshold is met, however, significance could also tip the balance in
favor of or against finding a liberty interest since there is a wide
spectrum of potential significance above the de minimis floor.
Using empirical evidence to evaluate typicality would entail
adopting the practice of the circuits within the fact-based category.245
244. Experience with the development of the Hewitt approach indicates that state
actors do not necessarily conform their behavior to avoid potential litigation.
Although the Hewitt decision could have spurred state actors to eliminate mandatory
language and substantive predicates from state statutes and regulations, and to give
prison officials unfettered discretion in all aspects of prison administration, this did
not occur. See supra text accompanying notes 62-73 (discussing Hewitt).
245. Although many areas of law that are associated with public policy, such as
welfare law, may benefit from the use of empirical evidence, its use is especially fitting
and necessary in the prisoners' rights context. The potential for abuse is high when
the state has physical custody of an individual, and when there is arguably a lack of
2004]
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As discussed in Part III.A., consideration of typicality first requires
consideration of an appropriate baseline for comparison. The next
part of this inquiry would entail gathering statistical data about the
frequency with which the challenged action occurs. Using affidavits
and deposition testimony to describe the conditions and circumstances
of the challenged action is another mechanism for examining actual
state practices.246
As for significance, courts have long understood how to make such
determinations. In the prisoners' rights context, courts routinely
determine whether a use of force is de minimis in analyzing Eighth
Amendment excessive force cases.247  Moreover, distinguishing
between what is important and what is unimportant is "no more
difficult than many other judicial tasks, 248  and any alleged
deprivation that is not de minimis is potentially significant.249
accountability or even access to information about conditions and practices in prisons.
Moreover, prisoners are particularly vulnerable by virtue of being disenfranchised in
many states because of their criminal convictions.
246. Relying on empirical evidence of actual state practices can be contrasted with
some courts' use of judicial notice. In Leslie v. Doyle, 125 F.3d 1132 (7th Cir. 1997),
the Seventh Circuit implicitly approved the district court's action in taking judicial
notice of disciplinary segregation conditions, as opposed to requiring any evidence
regarding these conditions. The district court simply assumed that a 15-day
confinement in disciplinary segregation was not "atypical and significant," as opposed
to requiring evidence about average lengths of such confinement. See id. at 1135. It is
possible that the court relied more heavily on a determination that 15 days was not
significant, but it is not clear. In any event, since judicial notice is a mechanism by
which a court can
recognize the existence and truth of certain facts.., which, from their
nature, are not properly the subject of testimony, or which are universally
regarded as established by common notoriety, e.g., the laws of the state,
international law, historical events, the constitution and course of nature,
main geographical features, etc.
it does not appear to have been appropriate in this context. Black's Law Dictionary
848 (6th ed. 1990).
247. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); cf. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319 (1989) (explaining the frivolousness standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) for
dismissing in forma pauperis complaints that fail to state a claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)).
248. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 500 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (de minimis line defining property interests)); cf.
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 117 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing
relevance of de minimis victory for calculating attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. §
1988).
249. An example of how to measure significance above the de minimis threshold is
found in Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff Mary Ann
Carlo filed suit alleging that she had been denied access to a telephone following her
arrest. See id. at 495. She had been arrested at about 12 a.m. for driving while
intoxicated, taken to the county jail and held overnight. See id. She was denied access
to a telephone, despite several requests, until about 2:00 p.m. the next day. See id.
The court held that "the process provided by the California statute (requiring notice
of the right to telephone calls and permitting denial of a requested immediate phone
call only in the case of physical impossibility)" created a liberty interest. See id. at 497
(citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980)). The California Penal Code gives
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Using state positive law as a balancing factor means adopting the
methodology outlined in Hewitt, but changing the interpretive value
of that analysis. My proposal is to use state law as an evidentiary tool
for determining whether a deprivation implicates a liberty interest and
warrants procedural due process protection. An examination of state
statutes and regulations for substantive predicates, mandatory
language, and cabined discretion250 can assist a court in assessing the
relative importance of a particular procedure or program to the state,
as well as the legitimacy of a prisoner's expectation of procedural
regularity. For example, if a state has detailed statutes and
regulations governing classification as a sex offender, then the very
existence of that state law is evidence of the significance of the
underlying issue." 1  Conversely, if a state's statute regarding
placement in administrative segregation is broadly framed and gives
prison officials considerable discretion, then a prisoner may not have
an enforceable expectation in a particular outcome or procedure in
this context. 2
The majority of circuits continue to use Hewitt as a tool, either
explicitly or implicitly, for analyzing due process claims. 25 3  The
arrestees the right to make telephone calls, and "[w]hile the right to use a telephone
may not per se rise to the level of a liberty interest protected by the procedural
mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right of an arrestee not to be held
incommunicado involves a substantial liberty interest." Id. at 496 (analyzing impact of
Cal. Penal Code § 851.5 (1985)).
In determining that the hardship was significant, the court cited to Carlo's
inability to call an attorney which "often will be of paramount importance in
marshalling evidence in defense of the charged offense," or a family member who
might have enabled her to post bail and seek immediate medical attention, rather
than having had to wait until the next day when the jail arranged for her to receive
medical attention. Id. at 500. Framing the issue as being held incommunicado, rather
than being delayed in using a telephone, the court concluded that the deprivation met
the Sandin "atypical and significant" test.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 62-73 (discussing Hewitt).
251. See, e.g., Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997); see also supra text
accompanying notes 229-34 (discussing Neal).
252. See, e.g., Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997); see also supra text
accompanying notes 185-91 (discussing Griffin).
253. See, e.g., Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 545 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding liberty
interest in sex offender treatment where state created "a scheme in which therapy is
both mandated and promised, and the Department of Corrections is without
discretion to decline the obligation"); Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 583-88 (2d Cir.
1999) (asserting that Sandin did not signal the complete abandonment of Hewitt, but
rather imposed an additional "atypical and significant" requirement); Bass v. Perrin,
170 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 1999) (analyzing Florida Administrative Code
provision governing solitary confinement and holding that the provision for 2 hours
per week of yard time gave rise to a liberty interest); Moorman v. Thalacker, 83 F.3d
970, 973 (8th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Iowa's good time credit statutory scheme from
statute at issue in Wolff and finding no liberty interest); Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d
756, 769 (4th Cir. 1996) (examining state regulation for mandatory language and
"enumerated substantive predicates" before finding a liberty interest); Eason v.
Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiff's failure to "identify a
single statute, regulation or even internal policy directive" precluded the existence of
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District of Columbia Circuit, however, has equivocated on thisissue.25 4 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit appears to have categorized cases
in which Hewitt applies and cases in which Sandin applies. It has used
Hewitt in a non-disciplinary context,255 but has not clearly stated
whether Hewitt would apply in a disciplinary context.256 Despite some
variation, however, there is in general a relatively uniform practice of
applying Hewitt as an analytical tool for determining whether a
prisoner's claim implicates a state-created liberty interest.257
state-created liberty interest); cf Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998)
(relying in part on fact that state law permitted indefinite term in administrative
segregation to find no liberty interest).
254. Compare Franklin v. District of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(asserting that Sandin "firmly rejected" the methodology under which "District rules,
regulations and guidelines, which contemplate hearings, create a due process liberty
interest" in favor of a "prisoner- and discipline-specific inquiry"), and Brown v. Plaut,
131 F.3d 163, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (identifying whether the Sandin test supplements
or supersedes the Hewitt test as an unsettled question), with Hatch v. District of
Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (determining that D.C. regulations
contained sufficiently mandatory language and substantive predicates to potentially
give rise to a liberty interest), and Ellis v. District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1418-19
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (examining D.C. law for mandatory language, substantive predicates,
and bounded discretion while noting that the Sandin test "seems ill-fitted to parole
eligibility determinations").
255. See, e.g., Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1997) (examining
penal code provision giving arrestees the right to make telephone calls in finding a
protected liberty interest in the right not to be held incommunicado).
256. See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (limiting Sandin
to internal prison disciplinary regulations, and holding that the state's parole scheme
gave rise to a cognizable liberty interest); see also Ellis, 84 F.3d at 1418 (holding that a
liberty interest in parole survives Sandin).
257. In light of the continued importance of state positive law in liberty interest
analysis, an interesting question arises as to what constitutes state law. Is it limited to
statutes promulgated by a state legislature and regulations drafted by a state
department of corrections, or can it encompass an individual prison's written
directives and standard operating procedures? In terms of settlement agreements,
courts have reached varying conclusions regarding their import. See Beo v. District of
Columbia, 44 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a settlement
agreement between the District and a lone inmate could not give rise to a liberty
interest); Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 595-96 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a consent
decree did not create a liberty interest because it was not self-executing and lacked
sufficiently mandatory language); Smith v. Sumner, 994 F.2d 1401, 1406-07 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that a consent decree that provided merely procedural safeguards did
not create a liberty interest); DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 535 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a consent decree did not constrain official discretion and thus did not
create a liberty interest); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1123 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a remedial decree could not serve as a basis for § 1983 liability);
compare Virgili v. Gilbert, 272 F.3d 391, 394-95 (6th Cir. 2001) (declining to rule on
whether a "settlement agreement is tantamount to a state regulation" and thus could
give rise to a liberty interest), and Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 769 n.8 (4th Cir.
1996) (declining to decide whether a consent decree, standing alone, could give rise to
a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause), with Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941
F.2d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that consent decree gave rise to a liberty interest).
In Chambers v. Colorado Department of Corrections, 205 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir.
2000), the Tenth Circuit relied on a regular course of conduct by state officials rather
than state positive law in finding a liberty interest. Plaintiff John Chambers
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B. Evaluation
With respect to ease of application, a multifactor balancing test that
requires the development of empirical evidence for making a
typicality determination as well as consideration of significance and
state law is more difficult to apply than any of the four approaches
outlined in Part III. In addition to the difficulties of a fact-based
approach, discussed in Part III.A., courts would be required to
consider two additional factors, and then make judgments about their
relative weight. One practical implication of requiring a fact-based
analysis is that courts would have to allow for discovery that may be
broader than they typically permit in prisoner cases. In terms of
interrogatories and document requests, although state departments of
corrections probably maintain some records regarding the subject
matter of prisoner litigation, such as disciplinary proceedings, prisoner
classification, and housing placements, these records may not be
maintained that he had a liberty interest in continued receipt of a higher rate of
earned time credits, despite his refusal to participate in the prison's Sexual Offender
Treatment Program ("SOTP"), which he characterized as tantamount to accepting "a
highly stigmatizing label." Id. at 1241. Chambers had been arrested and charged with
first degree sexual assault, but had not been convicted of the charge. Id. at 1238. Both
Chambers and the party charging sexual assault agreed that the two were living
together for a short time and had been drinking on the night of the incident. Id. at
1238-39. Chambers asserted that the sex was consensual, and the alleged victim
subsequently dropped the charges. See id. Chambers began serving his sentence in
1985 and was classified as a sexual offender in 1987, but he did not participate in
SOTP. See id. at 1238. Chambers was not eligible for participation in the treatment
program because he "refused to acknowledge his problems in this area." Id. at 1238
n.4. Instead, he "completed his GED, a basic and advanced welding class, a basic
mental health program, was assigned as a law librarian in 1991, and was report free,
and definitely not considered a management problem."' Id. at 1238.
In 1992, five years after his initial classification, a prison case manager
"recommended reducing the monthly ten days of earned time credit he received to
seven days." Id. at 1239. "[A1]though the same factual predicates for classifying him a
sex offender have existed since he was first so labeled, only in 1992 were earned time
credits taken away as a consequence of the label." Id. at 1241. The court asserted that
Chambers had no liberty interest in avoiding classification as a sex offender, but that
the defendant had "through its administrative policy applied the SOTP to Mr.
Chambers in such a way as to permit him to continue to receive the benefit of the
maximum amount of earned time credit" even though he did not admit the status or
participate in SOTP. Id. at 1242. Although the defendant had no discretion in
deciding whether to apply the sex offender label, it appeared to have "whatever
discretion it chooses in deciding what conduct satisfies the consequences of the label."
Id. at 1243. The court held that Chambers had "a liberty interest in the consequences
of the mandatory label which [the defendant] then arbitrarily removed without
affording him any opportunity to a hearing to challenge the label." Id. Rather than
limiting its inquiry to statutory entitlements, the Tenth Circuit held that the
defendant's course of conduct gave rise to a state-created liberty interest.
From a prisoner's perspective what prison guards actually do on a day-to-day
basis may be a more significant and real manifestation of the law than what is written
in state regulations. But cf. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995) (asserting
that the purpose of prison regulations is to provide guidance to prison officials as
opposed to rights for prisoners).
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complete, and they may not be compiled in a usable form. Another
possibility is that the state may not have the requisite computer
capacity to organize this information. All of these potential problems
would, however, dissipate over time, as departments of corrections
realized the need to collect and maintain a database of such
information. Each state's department of corrections could gather
relevant data, such as the numbers and percentages of prisoners who
are placed in various kinds of segregated housing and the average
lengths of stay in such housing, from the various prisons within the
state. Preparing affidavits and/or taking and defending depositions
would also impose a cost on the state.
In terms of who has the burden of proving typicality, the state
would be more capable of gathering evidence than the typical pro se
prisoner plaintiff.2 8 Placing the burden of production, and possibly
persuasion, on the defendant also accords with the reality that
statistical information regarding the typicality of occurrences such as a
housing placement (in disciplinary or administrative segregation) for a
specific duration (case law revealed a range of fifteen days to eight
years) is exclusively in the defendant's possession. An alternative
solution might be to appoint counsel for individual prisoners alleging
due process violations,259 or perhaps classes of prisoners making such
allegations.26 ° Appointed counsel may also help to prevent the need
for a remand following an appeal.26'
258. In Colon v. Howard, the court faulted the defendant for failing to adduce any
evidence of typicality at trial or to produce "any data showing that New York
frequently removes prisoners from general population for as long as the 305 days that
[the plaintiff] served." 215 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2000). Rather than requiring the
plaintiff to prove atypicality, the court gave the defendant the burden of proving
typicality. See id.
259. See id. at 232 (noting that a factual record including "evidence of the
psychological effects of prolonged confinement in isolation and the precise frequency
of SHU confinements of varying durations.., will more likely result if counsel is
appointed for the prisoner"); Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389, 395 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999).
The Welch court stated that:
In an early case that may establish binding law as to whether periods in the
SHU deprive prisoners of liberty under the Due Process Clause, it is
important for the court to be presented with a full and accurate picture of
the comparison between SHU confinement and the ordinary incidents of
prison life. An unrepresented prisoner may be incapable of presenting all
the pertinent evidence on his side.
Id.
260. Both circuits that have taken a fact-based approach, the Second and District of
Columbia Circuits, have well-established and well-respected public interest
organizations that litigate cases on behalf of prisoners. New York has the Legal Aid
Society, Prisoners' Rights Project and Prisoners' Legal Services, and Washington, DC
has the DC Prisoners' Legal Services Project, the Public Defender Service's Prisoners'
Rights Program, and the ACLU National Prison Project.
261. See Colon, 215 F.3d at 232 (referencing remands for factual development in
other cases and advising district courts to make particularized findings (citing Welch,
196 F.3d at 393-95; Brooks v. DiFasi, 112 F.3d 46, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1997); Miller v.
Selsky, 111 F.3d 7, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1997))).
THE LAW OF TYPICALITY
It may be that implementing a more difficult process for
determining whether there is a liberty interest will have the effect of
encouraging courts to skip this first step question, and answer the
potentially easier second step question of what process is due. In
Williams v. Fountain,62 plaintiff Jeffery Williams challenged a
disciplinary proceeding in which he was sentenced to twelve months
of disciplinary confinement for assaulting another inmate with a pool
cue.26 The court assumed that Williams' punishment, "especially the
full year of solitary confinement," satisfied the "atypical and
significant" hardship test without conducting more of a factual or legal
analysis. 6" It then considered Williams' assertion that his due process
rights had been violated "by the prison officials' failure to evaluate the
credibility of confidential informants... [and] to establish any record
evidence in support of his conviction. 2 65 The disciplinary committee
had relied on an investigation report without hearing testimony from
the investigating officer or the confidential witnesses. 266 Although the
disciplinary proceedings did not "document some good faith
investigation and findings as to the credibility of confidential
informants and the reliability of the information provided by them, 267
the court held that Williams' own statement provided a sufficient
independent basis for meeting the due process standard that a
disciplinary conviction be "supported by some evidence in the
record. '268 Perhaps assuming a liberty interest in every case and then
proceeding to a Mathews v. Eldridge2 69 analysis of what process is due
would be a more efficient means of deciding prisoners' due process
cases, but a full analysis of this possibility is beyond the scope of this
Article.
As evaluated along the second continuum, my proposal would
262. 77 F.3d 372 (11th Cir. 1996).
263. See id. at 373-74. Williams was also sentenced to 45 days of store restriction
and incentive privilege restriction. Id. at 374. He filed an administrative appeal, and
appeals to the prison warden and deputy commissioner of the Georgia Department of
Corrections, which were denied, and then filed suit in federal court. Id.
264. See id. at 374 n.3.
265. Id. at 374.
266. See id. at 373-74. The hearings investigator based his report on "the charging
staff's statements, confidential witness statements, and Williams' own admission that
he had participated in a fight with the other inmate (though Williams denied that a
pool cue was involved)." Id.
267. Id. at 375 (citing Kyle v. Hanberry, 677 F.2d 1386, 1390-91 (11th Cir. 1982));
see also id. at 375 n.4 (collecting pre-Sandin cases requiring that confidential
informants' credibility be evaluated).
268. Id. at 375 (quoting Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454
(1985)). Williams's statement was that: "There was no pool stick involved, but we
did have a fight." Id. at 375. The specific charge against him was "physical encounter
causing or intending to cause serious physical injury," and Williams did not dispute
that the other inmate suffered such injury, nor that the physical encounter between
him and the other inmate caused the injury. See id. at 376.
269. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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receive relatively high scores for consistency, at least within a
statewide context. A fact-based analysis helps to ensure that the
typicality standard does not devolve into an ad hoc, subjective
assessment of what is within the realm of acceptable behaviors and
outcomes. The variances in outcomes as courts have attempted to
apply Sandin without a uniform practice of relying on empirical
evidence is telling. The fact that one court determined that placement
in administrative segregation for less than a year potentially satisfies
Sandin while another court found that a placement in administrative
segregation for over two years does not attests to the malleability of
the Sandin standard when it is not predicated on empirical evidence.27°
Even within the same circuit, courts have applied Sandin in similar
circumstances, but reached different results. 271  Additionally,
mandating consideration of state positive law will contribute to
uniformity of results. That individual courts would be balancing
several factors may work against consistency, but this effect would
likely be counterbalanced by the requirement that their judgments be
anchored in empirical evidence and state law which are relatively
objective criteria.
With respect to integrity, this proposal would garner a higher score
than any of the four approaches discussed in Part III. It would entail
using a variety of analytical tools (typicality, significance, and state
positive law) to come to a principled decision about liberty interest
creation. Moreover, the method for using these tools is sufficiently
circumscribed to promote coherence as courts analyze typicality as
measured by empirical evidence and state law as an interpretive,
rather than definitional, factor. Balancing typicality and state law
with significance, as opposed to establishing three successive hurdles,
allows the fullest consideration of all potentially relevant factors.
An additional benefit is that this approach would promote the
development of a nationwide standard. In Wagner v. Hanks,272 Judge
Posner explained the legal framework supporting a nationwide due
process standard in the prisoners' rights context. He focused on the
270. Compare Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(remanding challenge to 29-week placement in administrative segregation for
determination of whether such placement posed an atypical and significant hardship),
with Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that two and one-half years
of administrative segregation did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship).
271. Compare Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
a disciplinary conviction that was unsupported by evidence violated due process even
though the consequences of the conviction did not give rise to a liberty interest), with
Strong v. Ford, No. 95-16404, 1997 WL 120757 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 1997) (asserting that
a disciplinary conviction based on manufactured evidence would not violate due
process or implicate a liberty interest because the consequences of the conviction
were not sufficiently atypical).
272. 128 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.). Plaintiff Thomas Wagner alleged
that he had been sentenced to a year in disciplinary segregation in violation of due
process. Id. at 1174.
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question of a comparative baseline, pointing to Meachum and other
Supreme Court cases holding that the transfer of prisoners from one
prison to another does not give rise to a liberty interest.27 3 Based on a
review of these cases, he concluded that the most restrictive prison in
the state constitutes the standard for evaluating what is "atypical and
significant." '274 Without deciding the question, Judge Posner also
queried whether "[t]he logic of Sandin implies that the conditions of
Wagner's disciplinary segregation are atypical only if no prison in the
United States to which he might be transferred for nondisciplinary
reasons is more restrictive., 275 At least two Justices agree that logic
and precedent require a nationwide standard of what is protected
under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.276
Although a focus on state practices and state law appears contrary
to the development of a nationwide standard, it is necessary if such a
273. See id. at 1175-76 (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976)); cf Bryan v.
Duckworth, 88 F.3d 431, 433-35 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing, but not deciding whether
the comparative baseline should be general population in the prison at issue, or
"ordinary conditions" in the state's most secure prison).
274. See Wagner, 128 F.3d at 1175 (citing Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708-09
(3d Cir. 1997)). The Wagner court additionally articulated a slippery slope argument,
asserting that if transfers were held to give rise to liberty interests, then courts would
have "to adjudicate transfers within a prison-to determine, for example, whether the
petitioner had been deprived of liberty by being transferred from a large cell to a
small one," and "[f]ederal judges would have been plunged deep into the minutiae of
prison administration, much as if they were managing a hotel chain." Id. at 1175.
275. Id. at 1176. The issue of whether the comparative baseline should be based on
nationwide standards was deemed factually irrelevant since the state in which Wagner
was incarcerated, Indiana, had prisons with conditions that were likely to be among
the most restrictive in the country. See id. at 1176-77. The decision did not cite to any
evidence to support this assertion regarding Indiana prisons.
One factor that Judge Posner did not consider was the likelihood that an intra-
or inter-state transfer would actually occur. For example, although a prisoner may in
theory be transferred to an out-of-state prison without first receiving procedural due
process, if such a transfer had never previously occurred, then this fact about
typicality might impact a liberty interest analysis. Similarly, if state law satisfied the
Hewitt requirements of mandatory language, substantive predicates, and cabined
discretion, and the particular prisoner singled out for transfer would suffer a
significant deprivation based on unusual medical needs, then a liberty interest may
arise.
276. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 489 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(criticizing anomalous result that constitutional liberty interests described as
fundamental and unalienable might differ from state to state).
There is a potential counter-argument that states should not be bound by a
nationwide due process standard, but instead should have the autonomy to decide for
themselves what level of protection they want to provide. For example, a relatively
poor state with a small tax base could assert that it prefers to allocate resources to
hiring more public school teachers, as opposed to more hearing officers for prisoners
challenging their sex offender classification. One potential response would be that
the requirements of procedural due process are flexible and would not necessarily
mandate hiring additional staff or conducting a formal hearing. Instead, it could
entail ensuring that a certain procedure is followed in the first instance, or that the
warden review the paperwork supporting a particular decision.
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standard is to be based on actual practices as opposed to subjective
value judgments. It simply is not feasible for individual prisoner
plaintiffs, or state defendants for that matter, to conduct discovery on
a nationwide scale.277 Over time, as courts cited to statewide empirical
information in their decisions, as well as information describing, for
example, the conditions of confinement in various types of housing,
the restrictions on those classified as sex offenders, and the
procedures for disciplinary hearings, it would be possible to develop a
database of such information. 27  Additionally, once each state has
developed a system for such data collection, coordination among the
various states' departments of corrections, or perhaps use of freedom
of information laws could facilitate the compilation of nationwide
statistical information.279
277. In theory, a nationwide class action lawsuit could provide a vehicle for the
necessary discovery, but as a practical matter because there is no financial incentive
for such litigation on behalf of prisoners asserting their due process rights, as
compared to plaintiffs in a mass tort case, for example, it is unlikely to occur.
278. Considering the impact that the court's decision in Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d
140 (3d Cir. 2000), could have on circuits that tend not to find liberty interests in
administrative segregation placements demonstrates the potential benefit of
promoting a nationwide standard.
Plaintiff Russell Shoats challenged his incarceration in administrative custody,
the equivalent of solitary confinement, for eight years. See id. at 141-42, 144. The
court easily found that the deprivation was atypical and significant, by applying two
factors explicitly analyzed in Sandin, 1) the amount of time the prisoner was placed
into disciplinary segregation; and 2) whether the conditions of his confinement in
disciplinary segregation were significantly more restrictive than those imposed upon
other inmates in solitary confinement." Id. at 144 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486).
With respect to the first, defendants conceded "that the amount of time Shoats has
already spent in administrative confinement is not only atypical, but is indeed
'unique."' Id. With respect to the second, the court relied on testimony from the
plaintiff and the Special Assistant to the Department of Corrections ("DOC")
Commissioner, Thomas James, to support its conclusion that Shoat's "long-term
confinement has imposed a significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life." Id. The court described his conditions as follows:
[The plaintiff] has been confined in virtual isolation for almost eight years.
He is confined in his cell for 23 hours a day, five days a week, and 24 hours a
day, two days a week. He eats meals by himself. His sole contact is with
DOC officials, and has been denied contact with his family for almost eight
years. He is prohibited from participating in any educational, vocational, or
other organizational activities. He is prohibited from visiting the library.
James concedes that he has never witnessed one example of such permanent
solitary confinement in his 22 years with the DOC. Moreover, James
explained that he would be concerned about the psychological damage to an
inmate after only 90 days of such confinement and would generally
recommend transfer to the general population after 90 days as a
consequence.
Id. (citations to the record omitted).
Although the circuits that take a narrow approach have either adopted or are
on the path to adopting a bright-line rule that precludes placement in administrative
segregation from engendering a liberty interest, Shoats illustrates that under certain
circumstances, placement in administrative segregation does in fact generate a liberty
interest.
279. The goal of a nationwide standard regarding, for example, placement in
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The need for the development of a nationwide standard is
illustrated by Beverati v. Smith.28 °  In Beverati, two plaintiffs
challenged their placement in administrative segregation for six
months following a disciplinary hearing during which neither was
sentenced to disciplinary segregation.281 In determining whether the
plaintiffs had a state-created liberty interest,8 2 the Beverati court
correctly stated that Sandin required it to "compare the conditions to
which [plaintiffs] were exposed in administrative segregation with
those they could expect to experience as an ordinary incident of
prison life, 2 3 but it never delineated the parameters of ordinary
prison life. Relying on prison regulations governing administrative
segregation, the court concluded that conditions in administrative
segregation and general population were similar, and that the
differences that existed were not particularly significant.28
administrative segregation would not be to establish a bright-line rule for every state,
such as: any detention of X or more days in administrative segregation warrants
procedural due process protection. Although such a rule could be established within
a state, see, e.g., Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 232 (2d Cir. 2000) (Judge Newman
proposed a bright-line rule that confinement in the Segregated Housing Unit for more
than 180 days satisfies Sandin's atypical and significant test), differences in the actual
conditions and state law governing administrative segregation from state to state
warrant different typicality cut-off points. For example, if conditions in
administrative segregation in Virginia happen to be far more restrictive and onerous
than a similarly labeled placement in Vermont, then procedural due process
protections may be required for shorter administrative segregation sentences in
Virginia than in Vermont. The goal of a nationwide standard would be to have the
various states' standards converge into as narrow a range as possible.
280. 120 F.3d 500 (4th Cir. 1997).
281. Id. at 501-02. One plaintiff was found guilty of possession of escape
contraband and sentenced to 30 days of restricted activity, and the other was found
not guilty. Id. During a time that the prison was undergoing reconstruction, a cell
search of the plaintiffs' cell uncovered "escape paraphernalia," including denim
fabric, "some of which had been fashioned into vests and modified jeans," and "two
packages of inmate movement passes." Id. at 501. This search was the second within
two months in which such materials were found in plaintiffs' cell. Id. Defendants'
rationale for the administrative segregation placement was that they "constituted an
escape risk and a danger to the security of the institution, staff, and other inmates."
Id. at 502.
282. The court concluded that confinement in administrative segregation logically
could not "exceed[] the sentence imposed in such an extreme way as to give rise to
the protection of the Due Process Clause by its own force." Id. at 502.
283. Id. at 503 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-86 (1995)).
284. See id. The court cited no facts in support of this conclusion; it did not outline
the parameters of living conditions in general population, and it did not then compare
these conditions to the conditions in administrative segregation. Instead, the court
cited to case law from other circuits which had concluded that "confinement to
administrative segregation did not implicate a liberty interest." Id. at 503-04 (citing
Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1413 (10th Cir. 1996); Crowder v. True, 74 F.3d 812,
814-15 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995)
(per curiam); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995)).
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The Beverati court purported to consider the plaintiffs' affidavits
which alleged that the actual conditions in administrative segregation
were more onerous than depicted in the regulations:
They claim that when they were initially placed in segregation, their
cells were infested with vermin; were smeared with human feces and
urine; and were flooded with water from a leak in the toilet on the
floor above. And, they assert, they were forced to use their clothing
and shampoo to clean the cells. In addition, [the plaintiffs] maintain
that their cells were unbearably hot.., that those assigned to
administrative segregation did not receive clean clothing, linen, or
bedding as often as required by the regulations... ; that they were
permitted to leave their cells three to four times per week, rather
than seven, and that no outside recreation was permitted.285
Accepting these allegations as true, the court nevertheless concluded
that although conditions were more burdensome than in the general
prison population, "they were not so atypical that exposure to them
for six months imposed a significant hardship in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life., 286  On its face, the court's
pronouncement indicates that prisoners in Maryland typically
encounter vermin-infested, feces-smeared, toilet-flooded cells which
are "unbearably hot." Whatever the variation in terms of actual
practices and state positive law from state to state, it seems clear that
the conditions accepted as typical in Beverati would fall below the
range of typical prison conditions throughout the nation. A
nationwide standard for typicality would give plaintiffs in outlier
states with practices that fall below this range a basis for due process
claims. It would also have the effect of encouraging conformity with
national standards for determining what deprivations give rise to a
liberty interest and when procedural due process protection is
warranted.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with a question: Does the scope of a prisoner's
constitutional right to due process vary from state to state? The
answer to this question is yes. Under the jurisprudence of state-
created liberty interests, a state's actual practices and positive law
should shape the level of procedural due process protection afforded
within that jurisdiction. The open question is whether there is a limit
to the degree of variation the law should tolerate. Focusing on state
practices and law will inevitably lead to a range of due process
protection, with individual states arrayed from the top to the bottom
285. Id. at 504.
286. Id. Although the court may have discounted the plaintiffs' allegations based
on its experience with other prisoner cases, it had asserted that it accepted these
allegations as true.
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of that range. A wide range would reflect the fact that there is no
national consensus, and in that case each state could have an
individual standard for liberty interest creation and procedural due
process protection. If, however, the state standards have converged
and the range is narrow, then a state that falls significantly below that
range could be held to a national standard.
My proposal is predicated on accepting typicality and significance as
governing principles in liberty interest analysis. Based on an
examination of how the various circuits have applied Sandin and an
evaluation of their approaches, I conclude that the scope of state-
created liberty interests should be determined by balancing typicality
as measured by empirical evidence of actual state practices,
significance, and state positive law. Employing this balancing test
would lead to consistent results and represents a principled method of
due process analysis. My proposal could also assist in the process of
developing a nationwide standard for procedural due process
protection.
Notes & Observations
